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Three Theories of Individualism
Philip Schuyler Bishop
ABSTRACT
This thesis traces versions of the theory of individualism by three major theorists, 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, as they criticize existing social, cultural, 
economic, legal and military conditions of their times. I argue that each theorist modifies 
the theory of individualism to best suit their understanding of human nature, adapting it 
where  they can  and outright  removing aspects  where  they cannot.  Based  upon  each 
thinker’s conception of human nature,  their corresponding theory of individualism does 
justice to that nature. With their view of individualism, each thinker criticizes the activities 
of their day for its lack of justice to human nature for the bulk of humanity.
I examine each thinker’s concrete conditions, their theory of human nature, theory 
of justice and their corresponding theory of individualism. In the first three chapters,  I 
examine first  Locke’s,  then Mill’s then Dewey’s theory of  human nature,  justice and 
individualism.  In  my  final  chapter,  I  critically  examine  each  thinker’s  theory  of 
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individualism and  find  that  John  Dewey’s  is  most  adequate  for  our  current  social 
conditions. 
Locke’s individualism was a criticism of the absolute rule of aristocratic 
Land-owners and was an attempt to undermine the conceptual basis for their continued 
power.  John Stuart  Mill’s individualism was a criticism of John Locke’s individualism 
insofar as majoritarianism had taken root in England and resulted in the “Tyranny of the 
Majority.”  Therefore  Mill gave  high  value  to  the  sanctity  of  the  individual  even  in 
disagreement with the overwhelming majority. Dewey’s theory of individualism largely 
was a criticism of widespread poverty and abuse of political power in America during the 
Great Depression. laissez faire economics, combined with cut-throat competitiveness and 
atomistic  individualism had  resulted  in  pervasive  injustice  and  Dewey  recommended 
recognition of our inter-connectedness and continuity rather than our separateness. While 
I believe Dewey’s theory of individualism to be most fit for our current social setting, even 
his theory suffers from problems yet to be worked out. I lay out these problems in the final 
chapter and conclude with remarks on what needs yet to be done. 
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Foreword
My thesis  will trace  the  origins and consequences  of  individualism from John 
Locke through John Stuart Mill and up to John Dewey. I explore the reasons Dewey gave 
for thinking that the old concept of individualism was not fit to solve the problems of his 
times. Further, I explore how Dewey recommended for the theory of individualism to be 
modified accordingly and why I  believe it  was more adequate  for  our  times than the 
previous two theories offered by Locke and Mill. 
My thesis will consist of four chapters.  Within each of the first three chapters, 
there will be four major sections: first will be a description of the social conditions in 
which the thinker lived, next will be a section detailing the thinker’s concept of human 
nature, following that is a section dealing with doing justice to  one’s nature and finally 
how this culminates in a theory of individualism. Chapter one will be an investigation into 
the feudal conditions and the rise of old individualism by examining John Locke’s theory 
of individualism. In the second chapter I explore the rise of the Industrial Revolution and 
Mill’s criticism of its effects in his theory of individualism. In the third chapter I discuss 
Dewey’s examination of the changing conditions during the Great Depression following 
World  War  I,  his  theory  of  individualism and  also  how  his  recommendations  are 
appropriate to  his time. Finally, in the fourth chapter I synthesize my findings, provide 
critical comments on each thinker’s theories and provide concluding remarks. 
In the 17th Century, those select few individuals who had privilege and power were 
kept in their advantaged position because of a widely accepted belief about human nature. 
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This belief was adopted from Judeo-Christian doctrines and buttressed the claims of the 
landed gentry during that time. The claims made were regarding their divine right to rule 
and their innate wisdom granted by God. John Locke professed an alternate origin for 
human knowledge: the tabula rasa combined with empiricism, whereby humans start out 
as empty sheets, devoid of any innate knowledge and come to know only through sense 
experience.  This theoretical move allowed Locke  to  undermine the  dominant  political 
status quo by questioning the innateness of divine rule by the aristocracy.
Locke further had a belief about  the state  of nature whereby all individuals are 
born equal and entirely free. The formation of government should be a consensual process 
in order  to  better  procure  the goods  of health,  life and,  most  importantly for  Locke, 
possessions. This is done only by sacrificing some small bit of freedom and liberty so that 
the government may procure authority. Justice, for Locke, is the rightful ownership of 
property, unhindered liberty and, generally speaking, as close of an approximation to the 
“State of Nature” as possible. Justice is, for Locke, the theory whereby private ownership 
provides a basis for peaceful cooperation of individuals. It is the role of good government 
to  preserve as perfectly as possible this state  of balance between individual rights and 
smooth operation of civil society. 
Nearly a  century and a  half after  the  publication of Locke’s  Two Treaties  on 
Government,  John Stuart  Mill wrote  On Liberty  partially in criticism of  the  political 
conditions brought about by widespread acceptance of Locke’s theories of human nature 
and justice. Locke’s theory of governing by majority rule had been taken to its extreme: 
the “tyranny of the majority” had emerged.  Mill criticizes this by positing a theory of 
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human nature defending the sovereignty of the individual against the majority except in 
instances  of  harm.  Mill  was  concerned  first  and  foremost  with  interference  by 
governmental institutions upon individual interests. Humans, in Mill’s view, are inherently 
rational and capable of acting as independent agents; they are able to  decide what the 
good life is. Therefore, social justice will come about from an aggregate of individuals 
pursing the good life.
In  the  early  20th century,  John  Dewey  diagnosed  the  impact  of  the  Great 
Depression upon the people of his time. The calculating quantification of Utilitarianism 
had become engrained in the consciousness of his time. Quantification of happiness was 
transformed into a business mentality whereby pleasure and pain had to  tally up neatly, 
just as the bottom line of an annual audit did. The pecuniary culture that was dominant in 
his day had led to  an imbalance of privilege and power in the hands of the few. This 
imbalance led to a new injustice whereby access and availability to the means of acquiring 
goods and services required for personal growth, and in some cases survival, was denied 
to  those  outside  of  the  wealthy.  Dewey posited  a  theory  of  individualism that  held 
independent  agents  are  always  socially  situated  and  composed  largely  of  social 
intelligence. Further, he believed that individuals were inseparable from his or her role as 
citizens1; therefore, to think of individuals outside of their contextual relevancy (regarding 
political status for instance) was to somehow miss the point. Failure to recognize this false 
dichotomy of person/citizen would be to fall into a sort of dualism; something Dewey very 
much wished to avoid. 
1 Citizen, for Dewey, was not merely a legal term. It meant a member of a community and no one was 
ever entirely outside of a community unless they lived alone, and completely cut-off from human contact.
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The theory of human nature that dominated Dewey’s work was recognition of the 
plasticity of our innate powers. Our nature is such that we are born with innate capabilities 
and it is our  cultivation that  brings these potentialities to  fruition or  spoil. Dewey felt 
justice was done when individuals were cultivated to expand their capacities and injustice 
was performed when the development of habits needed to  thrive was denied or  when 
habits of strict routine were ingrained in individuals, committing them to a life of robot-
like existence. 
In the final chapter I summarize the thoughts of all three philosophers and provide 
critical evaluation. I examine the tensions to be found between Locke’s theory of tabula 
rasa and his concept of reason, between his state of nature and state of war; I question the 
innateness of war in human nature, as well as apply his theory of ownership to  current 
corporate  practice.  I  scrutinize  the  business-like  nature  of  Utilitarianism,  Mill’s 
consequentialist inclination and I show that current pecuniary practices would result in a 
violation Mill’s harm principle. Then I critique Dewey’s optimism regarding Democracy 
and its short-comings outside of his specific recommendations and assess his support  of 
America’s entrance in WWI. Finally I provide my recommendations for what must come 
in order to harmonize our concepts with our existing circumstances.
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Chapter One: John Locke
I. Introduction
In this chapter, I examine John Locke’s theories of human nature, social justice as 
well as how he laid out  these theories in an attempt to  criticize the politico-economic 
foundations of the dominant class of his time. I discuss the social and political conditions 
of 17th century Britain, paying special attention to the feudal system and the role of labor 
in ownership. Then I examine Locke’s theory of human nature and his epistemological 
tabula rasa. I show that Locke’s theory was a criticism of the existing social conditions of 
his time. Following that, I discuss the relationship between human nature and his theory of 
social justice, particularly as it relates to equality, freedom and property ownership. This 
section will primarily focus on how Locke’s theory of human nature,  in relation to  the 
existent social conditions, was a criticism of social justice during his time. Finally, I discuss 
how Locke  believed these  theories  criticized the  theoretical foundation  of  the  landed 
gentry with his response: a theory of individualism. 
II. Social conditions of the 17th and 18th Century Britain
In the 17th Century, there was a small class of people who controlled political and 
economic forces so entirely as to almost exclude anyone outside of their ranks. This class 
was called the Aristocracy2 but was the owner of the vast  majority of land, resources, 
military power and wealth.3 These landed gentry held far more than mere political and 
2 Aristocracy is a Greek term for rule by the excellent. While the aristocracy of Locke’s time claimed to be 
excellent, insofar as they were direct descendents from Adam, a far better designation for this class would 
be the leisure class, the landed gentry or the plutocracy.
3 While land ownership was originally concentrated in the hands of the nobility and the King, during 
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economic clout; they were the beneficiaries of the best education, the highest privileges 
that possession of wealth could bring, and were the select few capable of playing a part in 
guiding the directions of their lives. While it was technically true that a peasant could have 
guided the direction of his life by having refused to work for their liege lord. This would 
occur by packing up their few meager possessions and going elsewhere; they would have 
merely been committing themselves (and their families) to  at  best  destitution (under a 
different lord) or at worst starvation.4 
Locke recognized this social condition for what it was: an act of social injustice on 
a grand scale. It was injustice precisely because peasants were no longer in control of their 
own lives, but  rather lived, toiled and died at  the whims of others.5 Locke set  out  to 
examine the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings cited by those who would propagate 
the continuation of this practice of exclusion.6 Since the conceptual underpinnings of the 
Aristocracy were  entirely drawn from scriptural  origins,  Locke  first  studied the  then-
dominant religio-epistemological basis appealed to by the leisure class. Christianity and its 
Locke’s time there was a rise in lump-sum purchasing of land from the aristocracy. This was done for 
many reasons, not the least of which was the effects of the bubonic plague on reducing the number of 
working peasants and the corresponding drop in productivity. Since nobles “rented” the land from the 
King, they in turn had to acquire wealth from their peasants. If the peasants weren’t producing, the nobles 
were not making their rent and as such, could no longer afford to sustain larger estates. This combined 
with an influx of wealth from Asia and America in the hands of the traders resulted in a tipping of the 
scales of land ownership away from the nobility towards the bourgeois.  
4 Since the feudal lords owned most land, and land was the sole means of production in an agrarian 
economy, peasants found themselves at the whim of the feudal lords. There were instances of peasants 
moving from one lord to another, however, they were merely choosing a new master. 
5 Peasants of Locke’s time were, in a word, slaves to their feudal lords. Locke says as much in his section 
of the Second Treatise on Government titled On Slavery where he discusses a slave as someone forced to 
labor for another against their will. However, this ideology did nothing to stop Locke himself from 
financially supporting African slave trade.
6 It should be noted that this was done at no small amount of personal danger on Locke’s part; he 
published the Two Treaties on Government anonymously as well as fleeing to Holland in order to avoid 
persecution.
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scripture were the primary theory behind the practice of total land ownership and absolute 
rule of a monarch; the Aristocracy claimed to have unbroken direct lineage from Adam7 to 
their day. Therefore Locke directed his criticism at these foundations. 
This  criticism was  primarily leveled  at  a  now-obscure  thinker  named  Robert 
Filmer. Filmer was an advocate for absolute rule of a monarch as ordained by scriptural 
lineage. Locke criticized this view in his First Treatise and summarized this criticism in the 
opening paragraphs of his  Second Treatise.  I  do not  take this criticism to  be of much 
importance to the document in contemporary times; however Locke clearly felt it was of 
enough importance to write the entire First Treatise on this topic. The gist of his criticism 
is that  there is no feasible way for us to  trace the lineage from Adam to  present day. 
Further still, it would not matter were we able to because the world was bequeathed to 
mankind as a whole and not just the eldest of Adam’s line. Further, his epistemological 
empiricism is used  to  undermine the  then-prevalent  concept  of  knowledge  via divine 
revelation.8 Since divine revelation was the primary “source” of the Aristocracies’ claims 
to supremacy, this criticism was one of considerable weight.
The  theoretical  support  for  the  Aristocracy allowed  them to  operate  without 
political check or balance. There was a vast disparity of wealth and power and it was this 
unequal distribution of possessions and ownership that struck Locke as being the central 
inequality of the feudal system. If people other  than the feudal lords were capable of 
owning the land they worked, the Aristocracy would lose its means of control. Concerning 
7 The Adam of Christianity’s Genesis.
8 His empiricism is primarily laid out in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. I take this to be a 
continuation of the tradition of Hobbes and Bacon. 
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criteria to use for determining ownership, Locke explicitly stated that “whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”9 The 
land the peasant worked became his precisely because he labored. Working a field is what 
made the field owned, not some vague scriptural citation. The Aristocracy claimed to own 
it  based  upon  scriptural  lineage,  but  this  defense was  shown inadequate  in the  First  
Treatise. 
If  the  Aristocracy lost  sole  right  to  land ownership,  Locke  believed that  they 
would likewise lose their accumulated political and social clout. But one should always be 
aware  that  Locke’s  attempt  to  break  the  strangle-hold  of  the  Aristocracy  is  so  that 
members of his class, the wealthy merchants, bankers and doctors, could obtain control. 
One also should not  fail to  keep in mind that  Locke made most  of his riches on the 
lucrative slave trade to the Americas; evidently his concepts of freedom, private property 
and labor extended only skin deep, or perhaps even only as deep as one’s pockets.10 
III. Locke’s Theory of Human Nature
Before Locke could begin criticizing the social conditions of his day, he put forth a 
natural rights theory to explain what existed prior to the existence of civil governments; he 
called this the state of nature. These theories had come into common usage with Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, but Locke’s theory differed from that of Hobbes. To begin with, he posited 
9 Locke, John Second Treatise on Government p. 19.
10 Glausser, Wayne Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade  Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 
51, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1990), pp. 199-216
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certain natural rights that existed in the state of nature and also called it “a state of perfect 
freedom.”11 One of these rights was freedom, but even though he saw this state of nature 
as one of absolute liberty, he did not feel it was 
one of license: though man in that  state  have an uncountable liberty to 
dispose of  his person or  possessions,  yet  he has not  liberty to  destroy 
himself, or  so  much as any creature  in his possession, but  where some 
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.12 
Freedom does not equate to the ability for a person to hurt themselves. Curiously, Locke 
gives no argument for this position aside from an appeal to the will of the creator and out 
innate reason which he believed would compel one to realize that: 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of our 
omnipotent  and infinitely wise maker;  all the  servants  of  our  sovereign 
master … they are his property.13
Because of Locke’s premise that one can not harm oneself, he extrapolates this protection 
to other people as well. His is often quoted saying that mankind ought to “preserve the 
rest  of mankind and may not,  unless it be to  do justice on an offender, take away, or 
impair the life, or  what tends to  be the preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb or 
goods of another.”14 This mutual rational protection built into the state of nature makes it 
a  time of  peace  and  prosperity.  Locke  described  this  state  of  nature  as  “men living 
together  according to  reason,  without  a common superior  on earth,  with authority to 
judge between them.”15
11 Ibid p. 8.
12 Ibid p. 9.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid p. 15.
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It  is important  at  this point  to  recognize what  Locke meant  by reason.  Locke 
believed that reason 
so orders the immediate ideas as to  discover what connection there is in 
each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, 
as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that which we 
call illation or inference, and consists in nothing but the perception of the 
connection  there  is  between  the  ideas,  in  each  step  of  the  deduction; 
whereby  the  mind  comes  to  see,  either  the  certain  agreement  or 
disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at 
knowledge; or there probable connection, on which it gives or withholds its 
assent, as in opinion.”16 
For  Locke,  reason is the bridge between ideas; it  fills in the  gap that  exists between 
separate ideas. In effect, reason is the glue which holds concepts together. Also, reason 
can lead to new knowledge, as is the case of demonstration, or lead us away from mere 
opinion.  This relates to  the previous discussion on the state of nature because men are 
naturally reasonable creatures and utilize it to determine how to live together in the state 
of nature. The knowledge of how to live together peaceably is garnered, presumably, via 
demonstration. This can only mean that the mind sees agreement amongst two or more 
different ideas and fuses them together through the use of reason.17 
For  Locke,  (1)  humans  are  naturally rational.  Further,  (2)  we  are  born  free; 
without an authority above us on this earth. Also, (3) we are born equal. Equality is not 
one of capacity, but rather of interest; we all have the same needs and the same rights to 
meet  those needs.  But  most  importantly, we find that  (4)  humans also  naturally must 
respect others.  If in the state of nature, a criminal has taken from another, the offended 
16 Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Chap. XVII, pp. 575-6.
17 It should not be assumed that Locke believed all men and women were born with full use of reason; he 
did not. In fact he details the steps to be taken in order to cultivate reason fully in his work On Education, 
and throughout the Second Treatise on Government. 
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party then has the right and the responsibility to enact reparation. Thus, men have the right 
to retribution but only “so far as calm reason and conscience dictate.” In fact, this is the 
extent  to  which individuals may have power  over  another  in the state  of nature.  This 
power is not arbitrary or absolute; it is only ever retributive. Aside from retribution, Locke 
believed humans should live in peaceful coexistence by the laws of reason.
However, the state of nature is only part of Locke’s depiction of human nature. 
There is a darker half: the state of war. The state of war comes about when an individual’s 
property, health or freedom is impinged upon by another.  It also comes about when one 
person attempts to enslave another; taking freedom is the same as taking life for Locke. 
Therefore, when any person attempts to take property, health or freedom, Locke believed 
that person had declared war upon another and therefore could be struck down just as a 
tiger or lion is struck down; namely, they could be destroyed as violent and dangerous 
animals, for that is what they would be. 
 It is interesting to note at this point that the state of war comes about when the 
natural gift of reason is not obeyed. It is only when the peace and tolerance of the state of 
nature  are  not  observed  that  the  state  of  war  comes  about.  However,  rationality is 
inherent; it is one of the faculties of human nature. A tension arises in Locke’s conception 
of rationality as natural when there are people who either choose to ignore it or abuse it. 
Positing just the state of nature would not adequately describe the multifaceted actions of 
humans; the state of war alone would also be inadequate.18 
18 Contrary to Hobbes’ view in Leviathan, chapter XIII, of life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” 
there have been extended periods of peaceful coexistence. While war has been prevalent in human history, 
it has not been omnipresent. It is very much the case the Europe has seen little in the way of peace, but 
Europe should not be considered the only case of human existence.
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This tension points to the another facet of Locke’s conception of human nature: 
the  tabula  rasa.19 Locke believed that  the  human mind was not  furnished with innate 
knowledge or morality. We start life, as it were, like blank slates of paper, ready to receive 
inscription. The process of inscription was sensory experience, and our minds received the 
information passively. This conception is the core tenet to Locke’s theory of empiricism 
and is important  for purposes of this investigation because this theory undermined the 
prevalent  epistemological  theory  of  his  time:  divine  revelation.  Divine  revelation, 
combined  with  a  supposed  direct  lineage  to  Adam  had  constituted  the  entrenched 
aristocracy’s  basis  for  continued  power  and  land ownership.  Locke,  by appealing to 
sensory information as the  primary basis for  understanding,  had put  into  question the 
statements and justifications of the ruling class.
While Locke’s concept of the  tabula rasa means that we are not furnished with 
moral knowledge at  birth, he also believed humans had innate reason which compelled 
them to seek harmony with each other. Yet clearly also, this innate reason is not always 
utilized for the purpose of harmony else there would be no state  of war.  One primary 
reason  Locke  believed  that  the  state  of  war  was  possible  at  all  was  incomplete 
development of reason in most humans, especially those responsible for leading armies to 
war. 
Human reason, when followed and developed properly, provides rules to live by; 
the “law of reason.”20 These rules are not  restrictions, in Locke’s conception; they are 
instead the very means by which freedom is possible. The law provided by reason 
19 See Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding especially Book I, section 1.
20 Locke, John Second Treatise of Government p. 32
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in its  true notion, is not so much the limitation as  the direction of a  free and 
intelligent agent to his proper interest,  and prescribes no farther than is for the 
general good of those under that law could they be happier without it, the law, as 
an useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name confinement 
which hedges us in only from bogs and precipes.21
Insofar as the law of reason assists an agent in accomplishing happiness, it is a good thing. 
When it ceases to  do so,  it ceases to  be a law. Without  laws to  guide action, Locke 
believed no one would be free because while reason supplies the means to accomplishing 
ends, for Locke it also provides ends. Locke states that “the end of law is not to abolish or 
restrain,  but  to  preserve and enlarge  freedom:  for  in all the  states  of  created  beings 
capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from 
restraint and violence from others.”22 
The  innateness  of  reason  needs  cultivation;  humans are  not  born  with  a  fully 
developed capability for reason. Because of the innateness of reason, Locke maintains that 
individuals are not considered responsible until they can understand the law. Some people 
are incapable of knowing the law, such as the insane, mentally handicapped and children. 
The primary need for governance over those lacking reason is their inability to know the 
laws of reason; because of their ignorance, they require guidance by one who does know 
the laws of reason. Each is considered to  be under a guardian; one who is capable of 
understanding the law of reason. If a person gains the capability of understanding the law 
of reason, as in the case of a child maturing or if insanity is cured, they are free from the 
need for governance by another. The appeal to the laws of reason forms yet another basis 
21 Ibid/
22 Ibid.
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for Locke to question the absolute rule of a monarch; unless the subjects are to be viewed 
as children, incapable of reason, people should be capable of self-rule through knowledge 
of the laws of reason. Rule by a single monarch would constitute placing those subservient 
to  the monarch into a state  of nature (or  worse a state of war) since the whim of the 
monarch controls their lives rather than the laws of reason.23
In the state of nature, people are inherently free; they live entirely by the laws of 
reason and are ruled by no other power. It is only when interests conflict, when people fail 
to  follow the  laws of  reason,  where  the  state  of  war  comes  about.  Since  reason  is 
cultivated (or not) and born incomplete, then in a sense it is a failure of education, a failure 
to cultivate reason, which leads to conflict. For Locke, if  individuals all have cultivated 
reason, interests would not conflict and the state of war would not come about. 
Locke did not believe that the educational systems of his time cultivated reason 
and instead he believed they largely taught unnecessary knowledge. He was opposed to 
teaching impractical knowledge and went so far as to suggest that Greek and Latin should 
not be taught to children since it was of so little use. Were educational systems to better 
assist people in the cultivation of their reason rather  than indoctrination or  passing on 
“useless” knowledge then Locke believed more conflicts could be avoided. 
Because  Locke  believed so  strongly in the  power  of  reason and its  ability to 
discern ways of co-existing, he also believed that people could largely be relied upon to 
take  into  account  the  affairs and doings of others.  Locke believed that  this ability to 
consider the lives of others made people capable of regulating themselves, which in turn 
23 Locke leaves unconsidered the case of a monarch that rules by the laws of reason.
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meant they did not require the added “assistance” of a monarch. His confidence in the 
power of reason meant that he trusted in the ability for people to have self-rule. 
Self-rule,  with the assistance of officials chosen by those who would be ruled, 
meant that Locke had provided support for democracy by appealing to human nature. It is 
within human’s nature to be capable of reasonable self-rule and co-existence with others, 
and in those instances which exceed the ability of any one person to decide, it should be 
the aggregate of  persons who decide.
IV. Justice and Its Relation to Human Nature
Justice,  for  Locke,  is for humans to  live freely, equally, rationally and to  own 
property by laboring.  This final part is of utmost importance because during Locke’s time, 
the primary economic means of production was land-ownership. In an agrarian economy, 
the primary way to  produce is to  cultivate land. Those who could not  own land were 
incapable of ever  controlling their own destiny; they would only ever  toil for  another 
because they could never own the means of production. This was so important to Locke 
that he believed land-ownership was central to  justice. Those who could own land had 
justice and those who could not were being done injustice.
As  mentioned  earlier,  Locke  felt  it  was  labor  alone  that  separated  nature’s 
products  from man’s ownership.  For  Locke,  when someone else  owns  the  means of 
production by which one toils, and takes the fruits of one’s labor in payment for use of 
these means they are in effect  doing an injustice to  one’s nature.  Put  differently, this 
situation would be one where the person laboring would be within the power of another 
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(i.e. the land-owner) and therefore would be in what Locke called the state of war. In 
Locke’s chapter on the state of war, he said that “no body can desire to  have me in his  
absolute power unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my 
freedom, i.e. to make me a slave.”24 Were it not the case that feudal lords owned virtually 
all lands, people would have had the option of working elsewhere. But the near complete-
ownership of land made this a situation of absolute power over those who worked the 
land. The peasants were therefore no better than slaves of their feudal lords by Locke’s 
theory.
Having the power over others that the feudal lords possessed was equivalent, in 
Locke’s terms, to  waging war on their servants. They had demanded their servants to 
relinquish their freedom; something Locke felt even their servants were not at liberty to 
do.25 Because  the  Aristocracy  promulgated  this  state  of  fief-slavery  (whereby  they 
acquired the  labor  of others,  involuntarily, because they owned the  land the  peasants 
toiled) they had committed to a state of war against their servants. Use of force is the very 
definition  of  the  state  of  war  for  Locke,  and  this  is  precisely how  the  Aristocracy 
maintained its strangle-hold: by owning the military resources of the day and utilizing them 
to enforce their land-ownership. 
Lacking land-ownership meant the peasants of Locke’s time were not free. The 
place of a fief is viewed as inferior to that of the lord and as such, the equality of the state 
of nature does not exist. According to Locke, the state of war can be resolved by killing 
24 Locke, John Second Treatise on Government p. 14. It should be noted that this injustice did not extend 
to actual slaves such as the ones he traded.
25 Because the servants were owned by God, not by themselves, as mentioned previously.
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the offender, or if the offending party admits defeat and requests a cease-fire.26 
In  the  section titled “The State  of  Nature”  from Locke’s  Second Treatise,  he 
describes a situation whereby a thief has attempted to steal from another. The offended 
party has within their rights the ability to “execute the laws of nature”27 that preserve the 
state  of  nature.   In  this  situation,  executing  the  laws  of  nature  meant  ensuring  the 
continuation of the state of nature; something that can only be done as long as everyone 
lives rationally and in harmony. Since stealing from another is disrupting this harmony, 
Locke felt the offended party was within their rights to doll out punishment according to 
the crime. Fitting punishment was to be decided by “calm reason and conscience.”28 What 
specific punishment would fit the crime is left unstated; also left unstated is a means to 
determine punishments outside of appeal to universalizable reason.
Since anyone willing to utilize force to the extreme of killing another was violating 
the laws of nature and the harmony of reason, the feudal lords were acting against their 
peasant serfs. The use of military force in the enforcement of unjust land-ownership was 
breaking what Locke called the laws of nature. Violating the laws of nature undermined 
the peace and unity experienced in the state of nature and therefore Locke concluded that 
“whoso  sheddeth  man’s blood,  by man shall his blood  be shed.”29 By this  reasoning, 
peasants had it within their rights to kill their lords for the injustice done to them by their 
hands.  This  argument  was  considered  a  powerful  incentive  during  the  Bloodless 
Revolution  and  the  American  Revolution  to  break  from  what  they  saw  as  unjust 
26 Ibid p. 16.
27 Ibid p. 9.
28 Ibid p. 10.
29 Ibid p. 12.
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governmental practices.
V. Locke’s Theory of Individualism
Locke’s conception of an individual appears, on its face, to be one of theological 
justification. For Locke, an independent entity is an individual because the creator grants 
life. All individuals are created equal in the eyes of the creator, so no one individual has 
the right to take it from another. These rights are granted by the ownership of the creator 
and unless one wishes to  go against the wishes of this creator,  one must recognize the 
rights of other  individuals as well. Human freedom likewise is drawn from a religious 
premise that God punishes; because God punishes, we must deserve it, and therefore, we 
must be free in order to  deserve punishment. Therefore, human freedom is founded on 
religious doctrines in Locke’s conception of it.30
While the State of Nature is Locke’s concept of ideal human interaction, the reality 
of  individuals  willing  to  enter  into  the  state  of  war  necessitates  the  creation  of 
governments. Because governments are a necessary evil, individuals sacrifice the absolute 
freedom  of  the  state  of  nature  in  return  for  the  security  of  government.  In  turn, 
individualism is tied to the state since the relinquishment of rights to the state effectively 
endows the state with the capability to  enforce infractions upon those rights by others. 
The state, and not the individual, now has the right of redress for wrongs. An individual, 
by this light, is not the absolutely free entity of the state of nature and the state of war; the 
individual has  compromised  freedom for  rights.  This  compromise  is  what  we  call  a 
30 Locke, John Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
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Constitutional State. This is what Locke views as the logical conclusion of his theory of 
individualism, a person who operates within the confines of a social contract, but is free 
within those confines. Best of all would be an individual who operates according to the 
laws of reason and therefore coexists with his or her fellow humans without the need of 
government, but that would also require the other person to  operate under the laws of 
reason. Since humans are born only potentially reasonable and not actually reasonable, the 
continued state of nature is not an option.31
31 Locke’s argument for this rests on the fact that Adam was created with reason, but Cain and Abel were 
born only capable of reason and had to learn reason (or not as the case may be).
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Chapter Two: John Stuart Mill
I. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the writings and thoughts of John Stuart Mill, especially 
his theory of human nature derived from Bentham’s utilitarianism, the theory of justice 
entailed by this theory and his resulting theory of individualism. To begin, I examine how 
this theory of human nature relates to  the existent social settings of his time, especially 
regarding the rise of the middle class in British political life and the transformation of 
Britain’s economy away from an agrarian one and towards an industrial one. Also, one of 
the largest political problems of Mill’s time was a result of the subsequent rise in power of 
the middle class and the antecedent exertion of their will upon minority groups and under 
represented groups. 
Mill used D’Toqueville’s phrase “the Tyranny of the  Majority” to  portray this 
practice for what it was: a new brand of injustice. For Mill, this was injustice because of 
his belief that  autonomy of  the  individual was based on  rationality and freedom; any 
movement or law that impinged upon this rationality by forcing the opinions of one group 
upon another was doing injustice to the nature of the individual. The use of wage-slavery 
during the industrial revolution struck Mill as an injustice on par with the servitude of the 
peasant,  if  not  worse.  Long  work  days  in  dangerous  conditions,  for  little  to  no 
compensation, appeared to Mill as a practice that did not do justice to human freedom or 
reason. It was to the end of bringing about widespread freedom, reason and justice that 
Mill presented his theory of individualism that will be covered at the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
23
II. Social Conditions of 19th century Britain
Mill lived from 1806 to 1873, the height of the Industrial Revolution and a period 
of drastic social change in Great Britain. Britain’s society was beginning to feel the strain 
of  industrialization  and,  more  than anywhere  in the  world,  was  becoming urbanized. 
Populations began concentrating in urban centers in order to reap the benefit of plentiful 
and well-paying labor to be found in the burgeoning steam-powered factories of London; 
lack of urban planning quickly became evident. Indoor plumbing was a rarity and disease 
was common in the London slums. Cheap housing combined with shoddy living conditions 
and child labor, at  the expense of childhood education, made for wide-spread suffering 
during this period.
Trends  toward  centralization of  money in the  hands of  the  middle class were 
continued,  following  the  fall  of  the  Aristocracy,  as  wealthy  merchants  bought  and 
operated  industrial factories.  The  power  associated  with  ownership of  land began to 
dwindle as agrarian economies shifted more toward industrial economies; ownership of the 
machines of production was quickly becoming the arbiter of social power. Even cultivated 
land could not generate the same amount of product as cultivated land using the machines 
of  industry.  Therefore  while  land  ownership  was  still  pivotal  regarding  political  and 
economic power,  it was waning in its potency due to  the rising influence of industrial 
machine ownership.  
British politics  recognized  this  shift  in power  and  began allowing more  voter 
influence in the parliamentary system. This was especially apparent  with the House of 
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Commons 1832 Reform Act, whereby nearly thirty percent of the British populous were 
given the right to vote.32 This began a slow trajectory away from power in the House of 
Lords and towards empowering the House of Commons, but even here it was only the 
wealthiest of the “commoners” that became empowered. These wealthy few were those 
fortunate enough to own the factories and mills that began pooling wealth in their hands. 
While  the  middle  class  fought  for  their  own  suffrage,  they  enacted  extreme 
physical suffering on women, children and workers in their factories.33 Even though wealth 
continued to  centralize in the hands of the few factory owners, living standards for the 
average worker were virtually stagnant if not  worse than during the feudal period. As 
Voth  indicates,  during  the  Industrial  Revolution  “[h]ousehold  budget  surveys  and 
alternative  indexes  of  living standards  such  as  the  human  development  index (HDI) 
strongly suggest that gains in living standards, broadly defined, were very small.”34
Sixteen hour work days were not uncommon and crippling injuries were far from 
abnormal. The working conditions of the poor in England during the Industrial Revolution 
were nothing short of a new form of slavery. The feudal system had been replaced for one 
of wage-serfdom. Like the peasants of Locke’s time, factory workers needed their job in 
order to live. But workers also needed their children to work in order to put food on the 
32 A Brief Chronology of the House of Commons. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/g03.pdf
33 This  is  best  demonstrated  in  the  testimonies  of children  workers  and  overseers  of British  factories 
during this time. Sixteen hour work days were common as were beatings for slack workers or workers 
found dozing off at the job. 
34 Voth,  Hans-Joachim  Living  Standards  during  the  Industrial  Revolution:  An  Economist's  Guide, 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  93,  No.  2,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of the  One  Hundred  Fifteenth 
Annual  Meeting  of the  American  Economic  Association,  Washington,  DC,  January 3-5,  2003  (May, 
2003), pp. 221-226.
              
http://www.econ.upf.edu/crei/people/voth/pdf_files/living_standards.pdf#search=%22Living%20Standard
s%20during%20the%20Industrial%20Revolution%3A%20An%20Economist's%20Guide%22
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table and pay rent for the shoddy home they most likely shared with as many as four other 
families. While it is true that  children had worked in the fields of their parents during 
feudal times, fieldwork was a far cry from factory work.35 
Further, because children were working as much as sixteen hours a day, formal 
education  was  all but  non-existent  among  the  working  class.  As Moykr  stated,  “[i]f 
England led the rest of the world in the Industrial Revolution, it was despite, not because 
of, her formal education system.”36 Because of this educational void, English children were 
not capable of intellectual development until after Child Labor laws were passed. 
III. Mill’s Theory of Human Nature
The unique education that John Stuart Mill received from James Mill, his father, in 
conjunction with Jeremy Bentham,  the  founder  of  Utilitarianism, deeply colored  John 
Stuart Mill’s thinking and writings. It is not difficult to track the influence of Bentham on 
Mill, he openly admits it; but while Mill believed that  Bentham possessed “remarkable 
endowments for philosophy” and amazing abilities at  drawing correct  conclusions from 
premises, he also believed that  Bentham was one “whose general conception of human 
nature and life, furnished him with an unusually slender stock of premises.”37 Mill hoped to 
“enlarge the number of premises while retaining Bentham’s method and basic principle.”38
Therefore the common scholarly mistake of equating the views on human nature 
held by Bentham with those  held by J.  S.  Mill appears  odd;  however  this mistake is 
35 It is primarily different in terms of daily length of labor and proneness to injury.
36 Mokyr, Joel The Lever of Riches. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 240.
37 Citation quoted from Bentham as found in Anderson, Susan Leigh On Mill p. 43.
38 Anderson, Susan Leigh On Mill p. 43.
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factually inaccurate and intellectually misleading. Mill dedicated himself to “expanding” on 
Bentham’s “slender stock of premises” about human nature and while Bentham believed 
that  humans  were  primarily  (if  not  entirely)  motivated  by  pursuit  of  pleasure  and 
avoidance  of  pain,  Mill believed  in  a  more  nuanced  view.  Utilizing the  “method  of 
Bentham,” Mill carefully outlined the principles upon which his ethical system is based, 
starting with the principle of utility and expanding upon it until he arrives at his political 
conclusions. 
But Mill was meticulous enough to  include the arguments for why he held each 
principle in the hierarchy that he held them in. To begin, he felt that “[a]ll action is for the 
sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole 
character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.”39 This consequentialist 
bent  belies  unstated  preference  for  teleological  explanations;  an  inclination  that  is 
understandable but nonetheless left unstated. 
Mill  demonstrated  why  he  shied  away  from  the  deontological  theories  for 
explaining human action, then popular, by criticizing Kant’s Metaphysics of Morality. Mill 
felt bald intentionality was inadequate, even for a deontologist, at describing the range of 
moral  behavior.  Instead  he  stated  that  a  goal  is  not  what  prevents  us  from acting 
immorally, but rather the fact that “the  consequences of [the goal’s] universal adoption 
would be such as no one would choose to incur.”40 The motivating force is avoidance of a 
certain set of consequences, so actions are taken in such a way as to steer clear of those 
outcomes. The motivating force is the concrete consequence to  be avoided, not merely 
39 Mill, John Utilitarianism p. 138. A very Aristotelian position due to its teleological leaning.
40 Ibid p. 140.
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our distaste of selecting such a goal.
Like Kant before him, Mill also believed there was an ultimate principle in the 
actions of humans. For Kant, it was the Categorical Imperative, while for Mill it was the 
Greatest Happiness Principle. According to Mill, this principle states that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
they tend to  produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
pleasure.41 
Mill further posits that
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and 
all the desirable things … are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in 
themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of 
pain.42 
These  two  aspects  of  seeking pleasure  and  avoiding pain simultaneously form Mill’s 
Greatest  Happiness  Principle.  While  this  formulation  sounds  deceptively similar  to 
Bentham’s own, it is nevertheless different to the degree that Mill believed in qualitative 
and ethical hedonism rather than psychological hedonism.
A  common  and  loud  criticism of  Utilitarianism is  that  seeking  pleasure  and 
avoiding pain is a philosophy appropriate only for lower beasts, but Mill did not believe 
this made Utilitarianism into a doctrine “worthy only of swine” for its obvious hedonistic 
slant.  Rather  Mill believed those  who view it  this  way are  too  narrowly interpreting 
hedonism.  Mill felt  the  comparison  of  hedonism with  lower  beasts  was  disingenuous 
because 
41 Ibid p. 144.
42 Ibid p. 145.
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if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to 
swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good 
enough for  the  other.  The  comparison of the  Epicurean life to  that  of 
beasts  is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do  not 
satisfy a human being’s conceptions of happiness.43
Mill felt human Reason elevated us above the wants and desires of mere brutish beasts 
because “[h]uman beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when 
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include 
their  gratification.”44 Mill  added  that  he  was  unaware  of  any  thoroughly  hedonistic 
philosophy that  did  not  “assign to  the  pleasures  of  the  intellect,  or  the  feelings and 
imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those 
of mere sensations.”45 Mill’s most  well-known remark given in defense of this  ethical  
hedonism is that “[i]t is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better 
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”46 Said differently, the appreciation of art, 
theater, poetry and philosophy, the desire to experience events that no “beast” would be 
capable of experiencing does not undermine the fact that desire for those pleasures and 
avoidance of pain primarily motivates humans according to Mill.
It is important at this juncture to note Mill’s adherence to a further clarification of 
the Greatest Happiness Principle. Mill felt it was not merely the happiness of the individual 
agent,  but  the  Greatest  Happiness for  the  greatest  number that  mattered  most.  Some 
object  that  without  this  clarification,  Mill’s  system yields  a  narrowly  selfish system 
whereby people go about seeking their own pleasure at the expense of others. In response 
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid p. 146.
46 Ibid.
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to this possible objection, Mill goes on to state that “there can be no doubt that the world 
in general is immensely a gainer by it [nobleness].”47 It was to this end that Mill said to 
“always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society.”48 There is 
recent neurological data that supports Mill’s belief that other’s pleasure is as important as 
one’s own pleasure, leading credence to his distrust of egoistic reductions of his theories 
of human nature.49
But in order to act toward the betterment of society, one must be the captain of 
one’s destiny. Mill believed that  “none but a person of confirmed virtue is completely 
free.”50 51  But freedom here is not meant in the metaphysical sense
A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are 
not his masters, but he theirs: who even in yielding to them knows that he 
could resist; that were he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there 
would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows 
himself to be capable of feeling.52 
Freedom, for Mill, is the ability to direct formation of one’s own character and not some 
metaphysical quality of mind that is distinct and separate. Mill believed that freedom is the 
feeling of directing one’s own life.
Because Mill believed freedom was practical freedom, also  known as  political 
47 Ibid p.149.
48 Ibid p. 156.
49 Moll, Jorge and Krueger, Frank and Zahn, Roland and Pardini, Matteo and de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo 
and Grafman, Jordan. Human fronto–mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science in the United States of America, 2006;103;15623-15628
50 Book 6, chap 4.
51 I would agree if a qualification of this statement were adding: only someone with a quality education 
can have “confirmed virtue;” syllogistically only someone of quality education can truly be free. By quality 
education I mean more than a mere collection of ideas passed on by the “method of authority” described 
by Charles Sanders Peirce in his famous essay Fixation of Belief. A quality education is where an 
individual becomes capable of self-education; where an individual has learned the “habit of learning” as 
Dewey later put it. To use Mill’s concepts, a quality education is one which allows an individual to direct 
his or her own life and not be a slave to either their habits or authoritatively acquired knowledge.
52 Mill, John Stuart A System of Logic, Book 6, chap 2.
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freedom, he further believed that freedom had its limitations. He stated that
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the  liberty of  action of  any of  their  number  is self-
protection.  That  the  only  purpose  for  which  power  can  be  rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.53
This concept has come to be known as Mill’s harm principle and it denotes his primary 
and most meaningful check on human freedom: whether or not one’s actions bring harm 
to another. If the action does not harm another, it is acceptable. If it does bring harm, it 
limits the freedom of others and therefore is self-contradictory. One’s own freedom, for 
Mill, can not come at the price of another’s. The harm principle follows logically from 
Mill’s  Greatest  Happiness  Principle  because  if  the  right  thing  to  do  is  to  promote 
happiness and reduce pain, any action that produces happiness in one individual but also 
produces  pain  in  another  could  not  be  sought  unless  the  happiness  of  the  one  far 
outweighed the pain caused to the other. When pushed, Mill also stresses the need to hold 
a principle similar to the Golden Rule.54 
Political opponents of Mill’s cited the unchanging nature of humans as their basis 
for viewing humans as by and large evil creatures, but Mill believed that much of what 
went by the name of human nature in his day was what Aristotle called “second nature.” 
Culture,  not  instincts,  was what Mill believed shaped much of human action. If Mill’s 
belief is true, then much of what was viewed as “bad” about human nature was acquired 
and  not  innate.  Therefore  the  primary  means  to  solving  the  overwhelming  bulk  of 
humanity’s problems, according to  Mill, was to  change the circumstances by which the 
53 Mill, John Stuart On Liberty p. 9.
54 More on the topic of the Golden Rule in Chapter Four
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problems arise. He briefly summarizes this view by saying that
I  have  long felt  that  the  prevailing tendency to  regard  all the  marked 
distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to 
ignore  the  irresistible  proofs  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of  those 
differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not 
only  might  but  naturally  would  be  produced  by  differences  in 
circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to  the rational treatment of 
great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human 
improvement.55
Mill went on to act upon this belief by attempting to enact the first Women’s suffrage laws 
in Britain, successfully enacting child labor laws, animal welfare and many other social 
reforms. 
Human nature, for Mill, was also largely determined. In his System of Logic, he 
gives one of the strongest defenses of determinism in the canon of Western philosophy. 
There he describes Necessity as
simply this: that,  given the motives which are present  to  an individual's 
mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the 
manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew 
the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon 
him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict 
any physical event.56
He further shows his support for this doctrine in the next chapter where he states that 
depending in the  main on  those  circumstances  and  qualities  which are 
common to all mankind, or at least to large bodies of them, and only on a 
small degree on the idiosyncrasies of organisation or the peculiar history of 
individuals; it is evidently possible, with regard to all such effects, to make 
predictions which will almost always be verified, and general propositions 
which are almost always true.57
55 Mill, John Stuart. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Gen. Ed. John M. Robson. 33 vols. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963-91., pp. 269-70.
56 Mill, John Stuart A System of Logic, Book 6, Chapter 2, Section 2.
57 Mill, John Stuart A System of Logic, Book 6, Chapter 3, Section 2.
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A common criticism of Mill’s view of human nature focuses on his attention to  human 
freedom opposed to  our nature as determined by forces outside of human control.58 He 
revised his views as he grew older without ever completely abandoning the position of 
determinism.  But  perhaps  this  tension  is  only superficial.  Mill could  very well  have 
believed that  while human behavior and action was almost (or  entirely) determined by 
forces  outside  of  our  control,  still  the  feeling of  freedom was  valuable  to  humans, 
therefore people should adopt practices such that they support human freedom. According 
to  Mill,  even though  people  can  not  choose  to  accept  or  deny the  argument  (being 
determined),  the  knowledge  of  the  argument  acts  as  one  more  factor  in their  future 
judgments.  
IV. Justice and its Relation to Human Nature
Mill dealt with Justice directly in the last section of his work titled Utilitarianism. 
There  he  utilized the  Greatest  Happiness  Principle as  the  arbiter  of  Justice.  Because 
happiness is not  just  one’s own pleasure,  but  also  pleasure  of  others,  sympathetically 
experienced, we can conceive of Justice. Mill states that the 
idea of justice supposes two  things; a rule of conduct,  and a  sentiment 
which  sanctions  the  rule.  The  first  must  be  supposed  common  to  all 
mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire 
that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.59
 
I take the rule of conduct to be his Greatest Happiness principle. Alternately, I take the 
sentiment for Justice to be a natural feeling to Mill as the 
58 Wilson, Fred John Stuart Mill Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
59 Mill, Utilitarianism  p. 198, clearly an adoption and evolution of Hume’s ethics.
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animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those 
whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human 
capacity of  enlarged sympathy, and the  human conception of intelligent 
self-interest.”60 
This desire itself stems from the idea of rights. For Mill, a right “reside[s] in the injured 
person,  and [is] violated by the injury”61 A right is something owed to  a person by a 
community; something expected and agreed upon. Mill states that a right is violated when 
one of five things occurs: 1) when liberty is deprived, 2) when a law that ought to be a law 
is disobeyed, 3) when someone is deprived that which they deserve, 4) when faith in an 
obligation is broken and 5) when judgment is partial and preference is shown where favor 
and preference are not due.62 
This conception of injustice falls perfectly in line with Mill’s view of human nature. 
Because we desire freedom and value it, when this is removed we take harm. The desire to 
receive what  we deserve comes from a psychological state  of pleasure.  This pleasure 
extends to doling out punishment, as well and Mill remarks that 
It  would always give pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of fitness, 
that  acts  which we deem unjust  should be punished though we do  not 
always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals.63
Since the Greatest Happiness Principle applies beyond our own pleasure, we should also 
take pleasure when others receive benefits from social interaction. Even were we to adopt 
a selfish attitude there is one thing that  no “human being could possibly do  without”: 
security. Mill believed that security is important to rational self-interested humans because
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid pp. 187-8.
63 Ibid p. 192.
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on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of 
all and every good,  beyond the  passing moment; since nothing but  the 
gratification of the instant could be of any worth to  us, if we could be 
deprived  of  everything  the  next  instant  by  whoever  was  momentarily 
stronger than ourselves.64
The need to protect ourselves involves cooperation with others. Because we depend on 
others, if for nothing else other than for them not to harm us, we should seek the common 
good.
Mill’s conceptions of freedom as essential to happiness, being the arbiter of good 
and bad,  combined with his conception  of  reason,  being the  expander  of  our  natural 
sentiments so as to include the multiplicity of humanity in our own happiness, results in his 
theory of justice.
V. Mill’s Theory of Individualism
Before Mill’s conception of the individual, Kant had reconstructed Locke’s views. 
He rejected theological grounds for individuals and instead posited metaphysical grounds 
in their  place.  Kant  wished to  make the  theory  of  individualism more  inclusive than 
Christians alone by removing the need for theological foundations.  Kant grounded the 
theory instead upon assumptions about the ontology of persons, especially related to their 
free will. Mill wished to make individualism even more widely acceptable by removing the 
need  for  metaphysical  agreement.  Instead  Mill  based  his  theory  upon  psychological 
concepts regarding pleasure and pain. 
This basis of pleasure and pain placed the theory of individualism within the realm 
64 Ibid p. 199.
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of empirical verification (or falsification). If persons were such that Mill’s ethical hedonism 
motivated their actions, his conception of justice logically followed. Mill likewise rejected 
the need for a social contract when he stated that 
A favorite contrivance has been the fiction of a contract, whereby at some 
unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey the laws, and 
consented to be punished for any disobedience to them; thereby giving to 
their legislators the right, which it is assumed they would not otherwise 
have had,  of punishing them,  either  for  their  own good  or  for  that  of 
society … I need hardly remark, that even if the consent were not a mere 
fiction, this maxim is not  superior in authority to  the others which it is 
brought in to supersede.65   
Mill felt the “fiction” of a social contract did nothing to solve the problems it had been 
created for. Mill’s belief that we can only interfere in the affairs of another when they do 
harm to  others means that  the social contract  would be null and void least harm were 
done. Further, Mill clearly rejects the concept of having some contract be binding which 
was signed ages ago, if at all. Therefore, rather than base his conception of individualism 
on  theological,  metaphysics  or  contractual  foundations,  he  instead  girds  it  with 
psychology. The result is his theory of individualism. Mill believed that individuals were 
the  arbiters  of  their  own actions  and so  he is considered  to  be one  of  the  strongest 
proponents for liberalism, checked only by his harm principle. 
65 Mill, John Utilitarianism pp. 201-2.
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Chapter Three: John Dewey
I. Introduction
I  examine various writings of John Dewey’s related to  individualism and place 
them within the context  of late 19th century and early 20th century America’s concrete 
social conditions. Next I examine his theory of human nature with its three components of 
habit, impulse and intelligence. Because Dewey valued the ability of intelligence to free us 
from the shackles of routine, it stands as a vitally important aspect of his theory of human 
nature. Therefore I show how his theory of individualism was a criticism of pressing and 
concrete social injustices of his day, especially widespread unemployment and continued 
wealth inequality.  I examine Dewey’s desire for social equality and what he called growth, 
particularly as it relates to  a  democratic way of life. Living democratically, for Dewey, 
was growing and utilizing social intelligence to  reshape habits and direct  impulses and 
therefore doing justice to one’s nature. A democratic culture and way of life, cultivating 
the growth of independent people is Dewey’s theory of individualism.
II. Social Conditions of 20th Century America
Dewey was born just before the final shots of the American Civil War were fired. 
While  he  did  not  directly  experience  the  war,  he  was  intimately  familiar  with  its 
consequences. He did not grow up in the South, and while he was not faced directly with 
the  economic depression that  followed  the  conflict,  neither  were  the  Northern  states 
entirely isolated from its effects. Even though Dewey was raised in a mostly rural area of 
Vermont, and later attended the University of Vermont, he was acutely aware of poverty 
37
in America.66 
One  of  the  more  influential events  in  Dewey’s  life was  the  formation  of  his 
Laboratory School at  Chicago. It  was during his time with the Laboratory School that 
Dewey came to realize the plasticity of human nature combined with the developmental 
aspect  of  human  culture.  His  experience  with  the  education  and  psychological 
development of children contributed to  his movement away from Hegelian idealism and 
toward experimentalism. Here he saw firsthand how it was that individual children came to 
acquire  knowledge.  Rather  than  rationalizing about  the  necessary  conditions  for  the 
possibility of knowledge, Dewey could see children acquiring knowledge of the world and 
applying  it.  The  experience  deeply  affected  his  concept  of  philosophy  and  was  a 
contributing factor in his turning away from idealism and toward a naturalistic world-view. 
The build-up of the United States’ entrance into World War I likewise effected a 
change in Dewey’s thinking, especially in light of his own involvement supporting the 
armed entrance of the United States into World War I.67 While Dewey “regarded no event 
as completely inevitable,”68 he had come to accept that America’s hand was being forced 
and that, by and large, would have no alternative except to escalate and enter the war as 
more than a financier and munitions dealer.. Dewey believed that a failure on America’s 
66 Dewey had witnessed the Pullman’s workers revolt of 1894 in Chicago, as he entered the city to begin a 
teaching position, and this had a lasting effect on his views regarding the dominant economic forces at 
play in  the  United States  at  that  time.  Decreased worker  pay combined with  stagnant  rent  led to an 
economic crisis  among the Pullman  workers.  With  less money coming in,  combined with constant  or 
rising costs, the workers were finding it hard to afford the basic necessities of life. Meanwhile, continued 
dividend payments of 8% were dolled out to shareholders as workers starved to meet rent payments.
Huffman, Nicole. Pullman Strikes Out.
67 Cywar,  Alan  John  Dewey in  World  War  I:  Patriotism  and  International  Progressivism, American  
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Autumn, 1969), pp. 578-594.
68 Ibid p. 579.
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behalf to  enter the war as a fighting force would very likely result in German triumph; 
something he also believed would eventually spell disaster for America.69 
Following  the  war  and  because  of  the  rise  of  monopolistic  corporatism, 
information propaganda and global recessions, laissez faire economics had failed to fulfill 
its promissory note of equality and public good. Rather than ushering in a golden era of 
human relations, Dewey believed laissez faire economics of “hands off” governance had 
wrought  devastating  consequences  upon  those  least  capable  of  overcoming hardship. 
Factors combined after the 1920’s to bring about the single largest economic depression 
the United States has ever experienced: the Great Depression.
During the  Great  Depression,  massive unemployment,  unchecked  inflation and 
widespread  poverty  arose  with  increased  crime  and  rampant  hunger.  In  effect,  new 
injustices had emerged from changing economic situations. The 1932 Presidential election 
centered on the cause of the Great Depression, with Hoover claiming it was the global 
depression largely caused  by the  war  while Roosevelt  blamed the  Republican policies 
during the 1920’s and underlying flaws in the American economy.70 
69 It is important to note that Dewey preferred peace to violence and his optimism about the outcomes of 
the  war  was  largely due  to  atypical  situations.  His  criticisms  of war  as  seen  in  Human  Nature  and 
Conduct,  published just one year after  his initial  support  of the war,  show that  Dewey cared little  for 
armed conflict. But he did not foresee the influence of propaganda on public opinion, and his optimistic 
view of democracy was eventually slightly tempered when progressive peace did not come about from the 
treaty process. Dewey also could not have seen the rise of the standing army and therefore likewise the 
military-industrial complex with its corresponding influence on the political process.
70 While it is could possibly be true that Laissez Faire was less to blame than a global depression following 
the War, Laissez Faire economics did little to nothing to mitigate the impact of existing conditions. 
Governmental intervention to stop run-away decrease in pay, increases in rent, continued inflation and 
loss of faith in the public of the banking system all contributed to economic decline. Interventionist 
policies could easily have meliorated any or all of these conditions, but ardent faith in a “hands off” policy 
prevented any such involvement. Therefore, even were Laissez Faire not the “cause” of the Great 
Depression, it was a contributing factor to widespread unemployment and continued injustice. 
Nelson, Cary The Depression in the United States--An Overview 
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Dewey witnessed the Great  Depression and declared continued faith in  laissez 
faire to  be nothing more than a shadow of a dream. Allowing unchecked freedom of 
business had resulted not in ever more just distributions of opportunity but rather in brutal 
disruption of competition through “legal” albeit unjust channels and the subjugation of 
workers to bring about sweat-shop conditions in order to maximize profits. 
The  living conditions  of  workers  were  never  so  obvious  to  Dewey until  his 
experience with Jane Adams and her Hull House from 1892 to Addam’s death in 1935. 
There he worked with, what today goes under the moniker of “charity,” to meliorate the 
lives of people who were economically downtrodden by providing adult education. Rather 
than critiquing theories of poverty and labor in abstraction, Dewey was able to directly see 
the effects of poverty and what specific conditions led to its continuation and cessation.
Despite the efforts of the Hull house, widespread poverty continued while massive 
concentration of wealth brought about an era of decadence for the minority, side-by-side 
with crushing poverty for the majority. This crushing poverty, combined with the inability 
for the average citizen to direct their future and live democratically, is what Dewey viewed 
as widespread injustice.
III. Dewey’s Theory of Human Nature
Dewey’s theory of human nature aimed, as elsewhere, to remove dualisms and he 
specifically focused on the popular distinction of his time: nature versus nurture.71 Locke’s 
theory of human nature was implicitly a discussion of an innate, inborn human freedom. 
71 Said differently, the “dualism” of human nature and acquired culture. 
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This belief in an innate human freedom continues to  this day as the basis for universal 
human rights,  but  it  also  is  the  bedrock  for  the  older  theories  of  individualism still 
dominant  today.  Dewey overcame this  distinction of  innateness  against  environmental 
factors by discussing the primacy of habit in human conduct, the role of impulse and the 
function of intelligence. 
Rather than stating a dualistic opposition between environmental conditions and 
innateness,  Dewey discussed  how it  would  be  possible for  biological impulses  to  be 
shaped by cultural acquisition, and each in turn directed by the use of intelligence. While 
all humans share a common biological heritage, the cultural differences between time and 
place are often overlooked when philosophers discuss human nature. Rather than seeking 
what is true across time and from place to  place, most philosophers take the unspoken 
assumptions of their specific culture as immutable aspects of human nature. All too often 
“philosophical premises taken to  be absolute truths of human nature and the good are 
instead only the consequential reflections, in intellectual life, of the historical and cultural 
circumstances that gave them birth.”72
Dewey turned this static view of human nature “on its head” by positing that even 
though accumulated cultural practices were “dominant” in the directing of human action, 
habit was inert without biological impulse. He saw impulse as resulting in one of three 
possibilities: either it is 1) “surging, explosive discharge –blind, unintelligent,” or it could 
be 2) “sublimated – that  is, become a factor  coordinated intelligently with others in a 
continuing course of action” otherwise it was 3) “neither immediately expressed in isolated 
72 Radin, Margaret Jane A Deweyan Perspective on the Economic Theory of Democracy, Constitutional  
Commentary 11.n3 (Winter 1994) p. 546.
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spasmodic  action,  nor  indirectly  employed  in  an  enduring  interest.  It  may  be 
‘suppressed.’”73 Impulse is capable of blindly groping explosively, re-shaping habits or 
suppressing habits. 
While accumulated habit may act as a channel for the energies of impulse, they are 
never so thoroughly ingrained as to  completely contain it. Our habits could become so 
“second-nature” (to borrow an Aristotelian term) as to appear as a native stock of powers 
and abilities, and even sometimes to confuse philosophers into thinking of them as native 
apparatus; but habits can be undone, inborn nature can not. At best, inborn nature can be 
suppressed. 
Direction of energies may be largely determined by learned response, but impetus 
to  action  is  always impulsive.  Anger,  sexual desire,  hunger  and  fear  may be  readily 
understandable, but they are only expressible and meaningful in light of acquired habits. 
The impulse motivates while the habit enacts. Taken individually, fear may appear self-
contained or even instinctual. But Dewey claims this is not so. The sensation of dread is 
never twice the same. It also encapsulates different subjects. Fear of birds is a different 
thing than fear of public speaking. Each fear has its own actions, separate and different 
and each learned.
However, Dewey also saw a role for intelligence in human nature. Intelligence is 
not equivalent with acquired habits or native impulses, but rather is shaped by and in-turn 
shapes each.  Habits “restrict  [intelligence’s] reach, they fix its boundaries,”74 and “the 
routineer’s road is a ditch out of which he cannot get, whose sides enclose him, directing 
73 Dewey, John Human Nature and Conduct p 156.
74 Ibid p. 172.
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his course so thoroughly that he no longer thinks of his path or his destination.”75  But 
habits can also play a liberating role for “the more numerous our habits the wider the field 
of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are,  the more refined is 
perception  in  its  discrimination  and  the  more  delicate  the  presentation  evoked  by 
imagination.”76
Habits may restrict the field of view, but they also make room for the possibility of 
expanding it.  “Rigid” habits are difficult to  escape while “flexible” and “refined” ones 
make for the possibility of expansion and growth. It should be noted that 
habit  does  not,  of  itself,  know,  for  it  does  not  of  itself stop  to  think, 
observe or remember. Neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection or 
contemplation. It just lets go. Habits by themselves are too organized, to 
insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination. And 
impulses are too chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to know even 
if they wanted to.77 
Dewey stated that the function of intelligence is to act as the arbiter between impulse and 
habit; it is the knowing aspect of human nature. Since neither habit nor impulse is capable 
of bringing to terms “old habit and new impulse,” Dewey concluded there must also be an 
intelligence aspect of human nature. 
Intelligence directs impulses that would otherwise randomly grope and applies the 
steadying influence of old habits to new situations. Fear of the unknown or hatred toward 
unspecified objects is the spasm of muscles and wasted effort. Without concrete, discreet 
and specific acquired reactions, fear is just recoil and anger is just explosion of thought. 
Each of the three facets of human nature work in tandem and “without habit there is only 
75 Ibid p. 173.
76 Ibid p. 176.
77 Ibid p. 177.
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irritation and confused hesitation. With habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a 
duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is 
conscious search.”78  
This “conscious search” Dewey terms  inquiry, following in Peirce’s intellectual 
footsteps. Inquiry, for Dewey, is the ordered investigation into problematic situations, the 
use  of  intelligently modified habits  to  guide impulsive inquisitiveness about  otherwise 
frustrating obstacles. Those who lack the properly “flexible” and “refined” habits required 
to engage in thorough inquiry are largely incapable of overcoming novel and unforeseen 
impediments. The inability to overcome problems faced results in discomfort, frustration, 
confusion and tends to bring about indifference, lethargy and laziness. It isn’t that human 
nature is inherently lazy but rather the concrete social conditions are such that laziness 
naturally follows. To blame a poor person who works a routine job for their desire to get 
the most done with the least effort is not to blame an unchanging aspect of human nature 
but rather a specific cultural response to industrial work.
Continued  inability  to  overcome  repeated  obstacles  may  result  in  random, 
perturbed groping impulses at best or resigned apathy at worst. Neither apathy nor blind 
fumbling is likely to  bring about  concrete  change and so those individuals lacking the 
“habit of learning”79 must  resign themselves to  forces beyond their control; forces that 
perhaps act largely outside of their comprehension. This resignation is acceptance of the 
individual’s incapability of changing their situation.  Being incapable of changing one’s 
situation  is  what  Dewey  viewed  as  the  absence  of  freedom.  Unless  these  shackled 
78 Ibid p. 180.
79 Dewey, John Experience and Education.p. 36
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individuals  happen  upon  fortune  or  inheritance,  they will continue  to  be  trapped  in 
circumstances beyond their control; they will live at the whim of others.
Because  Dewey viewed  culture  as  one  of  the  strongest  platforms  for  human 
freedom, due to the liberating ability of “flexible” habits such as the habit of learning, he 
saw maintaining the democratic institutions which brought about liberating culture as one 
of the primary roles for philosophy. Among the democratic institutions, Dewey believed 
education was of  the  utmost  importance  due  to  its  directing influence upon acquired 
culture. Education, for Dewey, had the possibility of encapsulating and directing the habits 
of  those  being  educated  far  more  effectively and  directly than  any other  institution. 
However,  this  is  not  to  say  that  Dewey believed  education  operated  in  a  vacuum. 
Economic,  political  and  religious  influences  also  held  sway  in  his  view  of  cultural 
transmission, but yet he had faith in the transformative power of experimental education.
Critics of Dewey often point to the existing public education system as being the 
result of his push for universal education. However, such appeals are half-hearted at best. 
Little of what Dewey believed was important in acquiring the habit of learning goes on in 
contemporary schools (much less the schools of his time). Experimentation, practice and 
social intelligence were the factors Dewey stressed, not regimentation, standardization and 
objectification of knowledge. Such practices fly in the face of Dewey’s efforts to expand a 
democratic  culture  through  universal  education  and  supplant  it  with  yet  one  more 
influence that retards human freedom rather than expanding it. 
So tightly interwoven is “innate” human nature and acquired culture that  in no 
uncertain terms, the acquired habits of humans are their freedom. Lacking free and flexible 
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habits, a human is consigned to a life of routine. But habits do not come into existence ex-
nihilo; they are acquired from the culture where a human being is situated and the culture 
is a complex of factors largely beyond the control of any one human. In a democratic 
culture, the people that  are raised with it have the capability to  direct their own lives, 
intellectually grow and change their concrete conditions. In a culture largely dominated 
and made static and unchanging, people are consigned to  their fates as determined by 
chance  of  birth,  class,  station  and  other  “accidental”  properties  rather  than  those 
“essential” properties shared by all. 
Dewey’s recognition that  even culture was influenced by and in turn influenced 
other factors that  shape the growth of individuals meant he did not believe in a single 
“underlying cause” that  brought  about  the existent  conditions. Rather,  the complex of 
institutions  work  in  tandem  to  act  as  the  conditions  under  which  individuals  find 
themselves situated. Changing one may or may not bring about a change in consequence 
because  these  factors  overlap  and  co-determine  outcomes.  Merely  insuring  political 
freedom is not enough to bring about lasting freedom, since the democratic institutions do 
not maintain themselves. 
IV. Justice and its Relation to Human Nature
Dewey spent most of his time “lobbying” for a theory of justice that can be roughly 
stated as equality. By equality he did not mean an equality of capability, but rather one of 
need.80 When discussing standards of living, he described one canon of social justice as 
80 In this way, Dewey’s conception of justice is similar to both Locke’s and Mill’s.
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that  “which demands  for  all  equal  industrial  opportunities.”81 Elsewhere  he  describes 
justice as “mutual benefit.”82 One historian of thought described Dewey’s efforts as 
one long sustained endeavor to break down such dualisms as that between 
subject and object, experience and nature, mind and body, duty and desire, 
the individual and society, the school and society, the child and curriculum, 
means and ends, moral values and science, the religion and the secular, the 
spiritual and the material, God and the world. In these divisions, Dewey 
found the heart of what he viewed as the pressing social and intellectual 
problems of the age. Overcoming these separations became for him both 
the way of individual freedom and growth and the road to social justice.83 
Equality of industrial opportunity, mutual benefit, individual freedom and attainment of 
personal growth make up the core of justice for Dewey. As he has said of other thinkers, 
however,  it  should  be  noted  that  this  is  of  course  a  matter  of  his  concrete  social 
conditions. Had industrial opportunity not been an issue, because of abundance, it would 
very likely have never appeared as an issue of injustice for Dewey. But in his time, the 
inability  for  nearly  twenty-five  percent  of  the  working  population  to  find  paying 
occupation so contributed to the social ills of his day as to eclipse other pressing matters. 
Dewey believed that the ideology of a previous era, the creed of the pioneer and 
frontiersman, continued in verbal assent but not in practice. The “rugged” individualism of 
the explorers or the Settlers was a concept of a bygone era84, yet still it held persuasive 
influence. The “mostly settled” and “mostly stable” America of the early 20th century had 
81 Dewey,  John  Ethics,  Part III The World of Action, Measures to Elevate Standards of Living,  MW 
5.509.
82 Dewey,  John Ethics,  Part III  The World of Action,  Unsettled  Problems  in  the  Economic  Order, 
Criticisms Upon Individualism, mw.5.474.
83 Rockefeller, Steven C. John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism, Columbia University 
Press, 1991  p. 2.
84 The influence of John Locke on even the founding fathers of the United States Constitution has been 
largely documented,  but  it  also remains  as  a  dominant  thought  pattern  and  cultural  milieu  until  the 
present day. 
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given rise to a far more inter-connected and “corporate” life than that of the survivalist or 
woodsman. He saw the concept of competition combined with outdated individualism no 
longer relevant to  concrete conditions as the primary culprits for social ills of his day. 
Even though self-sufficiency had become merely nominal assent of a by-gone era, without 
recognition  of  the  inter-subjective  cooperative  environment  of  contemporary business 
practices and social situations, people would be a “house divided”85 within themselves.
Dewey’s  first  criticism  of  competition  conjoined  with  individualism  is  that 
“competition cuts both ways.”86 When multiple employers seek labor, and compete among 
themselves to pay for it, the laborer is given the ability to select and choose the best price 
and  working  conditions;  the  reverse  is  true  for  the  employer:  situations  where  the 
employer is pitting laborers against one another leads to sweat-shop conditions.
The second and seemingly fatal objection to  competition as a means to 
justice, is that  free competition under an individualistic system tends to  
destroy itself. For the enormous powers which the new forms of economic 
agency and technique give to  the individual who can wield them, enable 
him to crush competitors.87
Individualism as a means to overthrow entrenched class interests, or friendly competition 
alone may not  necessarily be self-defeating, but the confluence of an outdated concept 
with fierce competitive practice is inwardly destructive.  Individual gain combined with 
competitive practice may benefit a select few economically, but on the whole it damages 
many (perhaps even those who “benefit” from it due to  the ingrained habits they must 
acquire to continue its practice). This taken with an obsession for material advance rather 
85 A chapter title from Dewey’s Individualism Old and New.
86 Dewey, John Ethics Mw 5.475.
87 Dewey, John Ethics Mw.5.476.
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than social welfare lead to  “[l]aissez-faire individualism hinder[ing] progress toward the 
democratic  ideal  by  mistaking  progress  in  technological  control  over  the  physical 
environment for progress in freedom.”88
It is important at this point to remember Dewey’s view of human nature; the role 
of  intelligence in expanding habits  and  redirecting impulse is an inherent  part  of  our 
psychological make-up. When it is stifled by rigidly acquired habits we are, in effect, doing 
injustice  to  our  nature.  The  condition  of  the  sweat-shop  promotes  blind  routine;  it 
promotes the acquisition of excessively inflexible habits. These habits commit the sweat-
shop workers to a life of the “routineer” whereby they are largely ruled by their habits, 
moving  from  one  situation  to  another  with  little  conscious  oversight.  This  dull, 
monotonous lifestyle is the antithesis of what Dewey felt was the “only meaningful ethic” 
of growth. 
Growth  is  the  central  facet  of  Dewey’s  philosophy  because  it  stems  from 
overcoming problematic situations through inquiry, through the use of intelligence. Dewey 
defines inquiry as “the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation 
into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.”89 The use of inquiry according to 
this definition results in ordering, directing, overcoming the indeterminate and becoming 
determinable. 
When telescoped to the largest and most general problems facing a society, inquiry 
88 Radin p. 544.
89 Dewey, John Logic: A Theory of Inquiry lw 12.108.
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does  not  result  in regulation  of  other  humans  (totalitarianism) but  a  harmonizing of 
individuals to  their  society.  Inquiry on  the  largest  scale is when people interact  in a 
democratic  fashion,  when people  use  intelligence  as  a  “community of  inquirers”90 to 
overcome systemic problems facing them, as a collective. But inquiry is not the use of 
authority to dictate final or ultimate solutions. Rather, it is 
[w]hen an expert tells a farmer he should do thus and so, he is not setting 
up for a bad farmer an ideal drawn from the blue. He is instructing him in 
methods that have been tried and that have proved successful in procuring 
results. In a similar way we are able to  contrast  various kinds of inquiry 
that  are in use or  that  have been used in respect  to  their economy and 
efficiency in reaching warranted conclusions.91
In this way, the role for education in bringing about justice becomes clear. Schools and 
curricula should be designed to assist students in developing the habit of learning, the habit 
of inquiry. By cultivating the scientific method and applying it in ever wider aspects of 
human experience, Dewey believed intelligence could be used to further human freedom. 
We would be doing justice to  our  nature  as the  growth  of our  habits allowed us to 
overcome indeterminate situations faced rather than being at the whim of forces beyond 
our comprehension or control. 
V. Dewey’s Theory of Individualism
Rather  than dwelling on  the  concepts  and ideologies from previous times and 
places to  explain and buttress his concept  of human nature and justice, Dewey turned 
instead  to  existent  situations.  America  had  become  corporate,  inter-dependent  and 
90 The community of observers is a Peircian phrase appropriate to Dewey’s theory of democracy as a way 
of life.
91 Ibid.
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collectively oriented. Therefore Dewey believed a collective mentality should be adopted 
to better interact with the existing environment. Only as our outward actions and thoughts 
harmonized with concrete reality would individuals cease to be lost and inwardly divided. 
This does not end with a meek acquiescence of the status-quo, but rather a re-organization 
to overcome a problematic disconnect. Even were this divide to be overcome tomorrow, 
the  harmonized  ideology and concrete  conditions  would  form the  basis for  new and 
different obstacles not currently considered, but a method and a means for overcoming 
those problems would be in place.
Dewey believed the way to  overcome problematic situations is already available 
and known. Previous philosophers laid the foundation and
started not from science, not from ascertained knowledge, but from moral 
convictions,  and  then  resorted  to  the  best  knowledge  and  the  best 
intellectual methods available in their day to give the form of demonstration 
to  what was essentially an attitude of will, or a moral resolution to  prize 
one mode of life more highly than another, and the wish to persuade other 
men that this was the wise way of living.92
By utilizing the  “best  knowledge and best  intellectual methods”  we can utilize social 
intelligence  and  share  knowledge  acquired  by past  experts,  modify it  to  fit  current 
situations using intelligence and collectively tackle the problems we face. This is the basis 
upon which Dewey formulated his theory of individualism.
The knowledge of individuals, when seen as parts of a whole rather than atomistic 
points,  can come together  in democratic activities to  investigate,  inquire and seek out 
solutions. Dewey stated that:
Science  and  invention,  which  are  themselves  a  fine  illustration  of  the 
92 Dewey, John Philosophy and Democracy MW 11.43.
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balance  and  interaction  between  individual  and  social  intelligence, 
individual effort and social cooperation, are making possible in many ways 
a state of society in which men have at once greater freedom and greater 
power  through  association,  greater  individual  development  and  greater 
socialization of interests, less private property but greater private use and 
enjoyment of what is common.93
This use of science, invention, past inquiries and social intelligence results in community 
oriented individuals, who realizes their interdependent  nature,  and who are capable of 
overcoming obstacles they face. He is not advocating a “nanny state” but rather a culture 
of  cooperation  over  and  above  one  of  cut-throat  competition.  He  would  not  have 
supported a government that promoted dependency, because dependent citizens are not 
free to choose their own fates. 
Dewey’s theory of individualism was not an attempt to introduce herd-mentality. 
In fact, he would be chagrined at the prospect of blind obedience to his suggestions, or 
dogmatic adherence to  his findings. His student,  John Herman Randall Jr.,  said it best 
when he stated that
Dewey  did  not  want  his  experimental  and  tentative  conclusions  parroted,  or 
reduced to a creed. He wanted men to go on working on his problems - that is, on 
the kind of intellectual problems that seemed important to him.94
Dewey’s investigation was but one step in a long inquiry. The individualism left to us by 
Dewey can best be regarded as a step toward the Great Community. It was Dewey’s hope 
that this movement would occur within his lifetime, because beliefs transmitted from the 
past had come to him in such a way that he saw a way to transform the problems facing 
93 Dewey,  John  Ethics,  Part III The World of Action,  24. Unsettled  Problems  in  the  Economic  Order 
§ 8. Present Tendencies  mw.5.498.
94 Randall, John Herman Jr.. The Future of John Dewey's Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, 
No. 26. (Dec. 17, 1959), p. 1010.
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him, clearing up the confusions passed down to him and proceeding in aiding others in the 
process of growth. Sidney Hook, another student of Dewey’s, characterized him as 
the  philosopher  of  human  growth  in  the  age  of  modern  science  and 
technology, as the philosopher who saw man not as a creature with a fixed 
nature,  whether conceived as a fallen soul or a soulless configuration of 
atoms,  but  as  a  developing  mind-body with  an  historical  career,  who 
because he does something in and to  the world, enjoys some degree of 
freedom, produces consequences never witnessed before,  and leaves the 
world different from the world into which he was born95
I share Hook’s conception of Dewey and I believe that his humanism, combined with his 
faith in human intelligence and his optimism concerning human freedom paint him not as 
the  technocrat  his  critics  sometimes  describe  him as,  nor  as  a  extremist  as  political 
detractors often labeled him, but rather as a philosopher of growth.
Etched upon Dewey’s tombstone is the final paragraph from his book A Common 
Faith, a work he undertook in an attempt to  make way for a naturalist faith: a faith in 
science, reason and humanity. In that paragraph, Dewey strove to show that
the ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. 
They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to  one 
another and the values contained in these relations. We who now live are 
parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has 
interacted with nature. The things in civilization we most prize are not of 
ourselves.  They  exist  by  grace  of  the  doings  and  sufferings  of  the 
continuous  human  community  in  which  we  are  a  link.  Ours  is  the 
responsibility of  conserving,  transmitting,  rectifying  and  expanding  the 
heritage of values we have received that  those who come after us may 
receive  it  more  solid  and  secure,  more  widely  accessible  and  more 
generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a 
religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. Such a faith 
has always been implicitely the common faith of mankind. It  remains to 
95 Hook, Sidney John Dewey--Philosopher of Growth, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, No. 26. (Dec. 
17, 1959), p. 1013. 
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make it explicit and militant.96
It is my contention that Dewey’s faith in the “continuous human community” characterizes 
most fully his theory of individualism. 
96 Dewey, John A Common Faith p. 87.
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Chapter Four: Critical Evaluations
I. Introduction
Having grown up in a culture largely dominated, in name at least, by the belief in 
individual effort,  hard work and just rewards,  I  was aware of a general theory of the 
rugged individual. But like most, I was unaware of its origin and evolution. I knew it was 
an important  belief that  was central to  economic theory, political parties and to  some 
extent  the business mind and American culture writ large, but  I  had only a superficial 
understanding of it. I remember hearing once, as an undergraduate,  the Greeks had no 
idea  of  individualism;  the  concept  utterly  baffled  me.  Did  they  not  recognize  their 
separateness? Did they not  recognize that  they each had thoughts,  beliefs and desires 
different from their fellow citizens? It was only later, when I began the investigation into 
individualism, when I realized those aspects were merely superficially part of a theory of 
individualism; far more important is what is native to all humans. Is the desire for freedom, 
the  desire  to  privately possess  property or  the  desire  to  possess  power  native to  all 
humans? Is the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure what motivates all human 
activity? Are human rights in fact inborn aspects of human nature? In the terminology of 
Aristotle,  what  qualities were essentially human and which were  only accidentally so. 
These  questions  and more  motivated  me to  do  a  historical analysis of  the  theory of 
individualism.
Being largely motivated by a desire to  understand the American culture,  I  first 
investigated John Locke’s work due to its influence on the founding fathers of this nation. 
I read his Second Treatise and found in it a steady usage of a concept of individualism, but 
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could find no theoretical underpinnings for the concept itself. I turned to his Essays and 
his Letter Concerning Toleration and delved into what he thought motivated humans to 
act. I also read some historical analysis and biographic information on Locke to find what 
had motivated him and perhaps what influenced him. I found the classic concept of an 
individual comes largely (although not entirely) from Locke’s time. Locke himself goes a 
long way to formulate a theory of individualism (although I never saw it explicitly spelled 
out  in  such  terms).  For  Locke,  individuals  have  a  natural  state  and  the  purpose  of 
governments is to prevent certain aspects of this natural state from being promoted while 
allowing others to  continue.  Governments are supposed to  prevent the “state  of war” 
while promoting the “laws of reason.” 
Next  I  turned  to  John Stuart  Mill because  he  makes  what  is most  likely the 
strongest case for individualism (in the traditional sense of the term). I began by reading 
On Liberty and  Utilitarianism but  slowly realized I  had to  turn to  his  Logic to  find a 
thorough explanation of his concept of human nature. I also found Mill to be a conflicted 
philosopher; in On Liberty he describes humans as primarily creative, free and desiring to 
stay  so.  But  in  his  Logic,  where  he  uses  a  more  thoroughly empirical  method  of 
explanation, he describes humans as determined by necessary factors, almost mechanically 
operating.  It  is  supposedly just  this  tension,  between  freedom  and  necessity,  which 
brought about  his emotional break-down, and it was a tension he apparently struggled 
with for the remainder of his years. On the one hand, he wanted to describe humans as 
motivated to act based upon a small set of characteristics, but on the other hand, he did 
not  believe that  human interaction  could  possibly be  described  with  such  a  set.  His 
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tendency toward Bentham’s hedonic explanation was never far from his mind, but after the 
death of his father and Bentham, he began to distance himself farther from each.
Then I turned to John Dewey, arriving at an American perspective on the tradition. 
As is the case with any research on Dewey’s thought, I had to turn to multiple books and 
multiple articles, from  Individualism Old and New to  Freedom and Culture to  Human 
Nature  and Conduct and beyond.  Individualism was a  theme that  Dewey investigated 
throughout the corpus of his work; he took this issue very seriously because it had become 
a  large cultural  factor  for  American life.  The  old theory of  individualism which held 
humans  to  be  born  equipped  with  natural  rights,  the  state  of  nature  and  even  the 
calculating utilitarian view of humans had made American into a house divided upon itself. 
On the one hand, people nominally espoused a theory of rugged individualism. On the 
other  hand,  almost  all of  our  activities require  or  culminate in collective action be it 
corporate business, team sports, civic life or even just communication. Very little of what 
went for American life turned out  to  be individual endeavor. So Dewey offered a new 
individualism, one where we recognize the interconnected nature of political life, where 
we do not view ourselves as atomically separable from one another. Therefore, Dewey 
suggested  we take  seriously the  fact  that  our  “beliefs” differed from our  actions  and 
recommended changing our beliefs about what it is to be an individual to incorporate the 
influence of culture and others more centrally. Does this end in a “group think” or some 
other such collectivist mentality? Dewey did not believe so, unless democratic activity is to 
be considered such. 
Finally I end my thesis with some critical remarks on each thinker’s theories and 
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utilizing Dewey’s theory of ends-means continuum I explicated what I believed was the 
next  means in line to  accomplish a  new individualism: public philosophic discourse.  I 
believe now more than ever philosophers should enter into public debates in order to be 
cultural critics and assist in assessing cultural practices.
Political, cultural, religious and military leaders during the lives of each thinker had 
taken  qualities  which  were  accidental  or  coincidental  about  humans  and  wrongly 
considered them to  be the basis for selective treatment, privilege and the determiner of 
inheritance of  wealth,  education and power.  Locke  criticized the  supposed  lineage of 
Adam combined in conjunction with divine revelation that was the basis for the dominance 
of  the  landed  Aristocracy  of  his  time.  Mill questioned  how  majoritarian  democracy 
combined with limited suffrage and the rise of influence of industrialists could serve to 
better the conditions of individuals in his day. Dewey condemned the dehumanization that 
was experienced during the Great Depression and chastised the status quo practice of non-
interventionist  economic  policies  for  the  staggering  unemployment  as  well  as  the 
exploitation of labor without appropriate compensation.  
Each  of  these  three  thinkers  was  criticizing specific  environmental  conditions 
during their  life.  While their  thought  can be extrapolated  and utilized outside  of  this 
context,  it  should be done with caution and hesitancy.  The continued use of Locke’s 
theories, once the dominant force of Aristocracy had waned, led to  the exploitation of 
majoritarianism. Continued existence of Locke’s thought combined with aspects of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism formed the intellectual background which Dewey criticized. The sustained 
belief in outmoded and inadequate  ideas in the  face of changing or  changed cultural, 
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social, technological and economic conditions results in the need for an adaptation or 
abandonment of fossilized cultural habits97; what is required is a new inquiry resulting in a 
changed conception of an individual through the use of human intelligence. 
II. Criticisms of Locke
There  are  five  reasons  for  questioning  Locke’s  theories  as  appropriate  for 
contemporary circumstances. The first deals with his dual state of nature and war and the 
innateness of reason, the second deals with internal inconsistencies in the role of reason 
for Locke, third is a criticism of the innateness of war to human nature. Fourth, I criticize 
Locke’s faith in the laws of reason. Finally a criticism is offered comparing Locke’s theory 
of ownership to contemporary corporatism.
John Locke’s theory of the state of nature, as adopted from Hobbes, is a two-sided 
coin. On the one side there exists the rational co-existence of humans, living by the laws of 
reason and in harmony. On the other side exists the state of war, where humans impinge 
upon the freedom of others, perhaps even to the point of taking their lives. While these 
two explanations appear to describe quite a large amount of human behavior, Locke also 
described human reason as  being innate,  god-given and complete.  One of the  central 
problems with Locke’s description of a dual-natured human nature is that the state of war 
only comes about from the corruption of reason. However, if he wishes to base innate and 
inalienable human rights upon the presence of reason, how would it ever be possible for 
reason to  fail? If reason is such a thoroughly ingrained aspect of our human nature,  it 
97 I owe this phrase to Nathan Ellebracht. 
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appears contradictory, then, for humans to ever be capable of entering into a state of war. 
Either  reason  is not  inalienable (or  said differently,  humans are  fallible and  therefore 
Locke’s foundation for human rights is shaky at best) or humans should be incapable of 
entering the state of war. The former is clearly at odds with Locke’s work and the second 
is patently false; humans enter into war with one another all too  frequently. Therefore, 
Locke’s theory of the inalienable innateness of reason needs to be modified to allow for 
the corruption of said reason. But if such a theoretical move is made, would those people 
whose reason is corrupt no longer be eligible for human rights? Without further revision, it 
would appear individuals with corrupted or incompletely cultivated reason would not, by 
Locke’s account, be eligible for human rights. 
Another tension found within Locke’s theories exists in his conception of humans 
as tabula rosa at birth compared to his conception of reason as an arbiter of right from 
wrong. On the one hand, Locke wishes to  criticize innate ideas (in order to  unseat the 
landed gentry as well as provide a criticism of divine revelation in general), but on the 
other hand his description of reason as the basis for harmonious co-existence in the state 
of nature appears to support a sort of innateness in reason’s ability to arbitrate between 
right and wrong action. For Locke, either reason has the ability to  innately know good 
action from bad action, or humans must cultivate reason to know good actions from bad 
actions. If humans must cultivate reason to know good actions from bad ones, then appeal 
to reason as the arbiter of right from wrong without appeal to the cultivation of reason is 
either empty or disingenuous. 
Locke considers the “State of War” to be an aspect of human nature. When reason 
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fails to arbitrate tensions, war is inevitable. But in Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey 
criticizes the innateness of war to human nature. While Dewey admits that war is “woven 
out of the stuff of instinctive activity”98 for humans, this does not mean that the act of war 
itself is instinctual. The conditions for the possibility for war stem from “anger, pugnacity, 
rivalry, self-display, and such like native tendencies”99 but are not themselves determined 
by these  drives.  Further  “pugnacity  and  fear  are  no  more  native  than  are  pity  and 
sympathy”100 but rather are themselves habituated responses to native impulses; to believe 
these will inevitably end in warfare is “as if the savage were to believe that because he uses 
fibers having fixed natural properties in order to weave baskets, therefore his immemorial 
tribal patterns are also natural necessities and immutable forms.”101 A stronger case that 
war is not native to our nature is made when Dewey stated that 
pugnacity, rivalry, vainglory, love of booty, fear, suspicion, anger, desire 
for freedom from conventions and restrictions of peace, love of power and 
hatred of oppression, opportunity for novel displays, love of home and soil, 
attachment to one’s people and to the altar and the hearth, courage, loyalty, 
opportunity  to  make  a  name,  money  or  a  career,  affection,  piety  to 
ancestors and ancestral gods – all of these things and many more make up 
the war-like force. To suppose there is some one unchanging native force 
which generates war is as naïve as the usual assumption that our enemy is 
actuated solely by the meaner of the tendencies named and we only by the 
nobler.102
The impulses and habits which lead to  war  are not  native to  human nature;  they are 
acquired  responses  handed  down  and  habituated  by continuous  use,  generation  after 
98 Dewey, John Human Nature and Conduct p. 110.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid p. 11.
101 Ibid p. 110.
102 Ibid p. 118.
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generation.103 To be sure, war is a deeply ingrained habit, perhaps, but to call it an innate 
aspect of human nature appears to be a hasty generalization.
Locke put great stock in the laws of reason. He believed that were it the case that 
all individuals were fully cultivated in reason, living by the laws of reason alone would 
bring about  the  state  of  nature  and require  no  intervention by governments  or  other 
political bodies.  People would,  in effect,  live in a  state  of perfect  harmony with one 
another, were they only to follow the laws of reason. However, Dewey was critical of this 
theory when he stated that
The aroma of the continental tradition brings about  the sayings of those 
who settle so many social problems to their own satisfaction by invoking a 
distinction between liberty and liscense, identifying the former with “liberty 
under law” – for in the classic tradition law and reason are related as child 
and parent.  So  far as the saying assigns to  law an origin and authority 
having  nothing  to  do  with  freedom,  so  far,  that  is,  as  it  affirms  the 
impossibility of free conditions determining their own law, it posits directly, 
even if unintentionally, to the totalitarian state.104
Reason,  by this argument,  dictates  to  the laws their possibility of freedom. However, 
whenever a condition exists such that  the law is dictated by a source other than “free 
conditions,”105 it runs the very real risk of fascism, totalitarianism, dictatorship or tyranny. 
Faith in reason, devoid of the conditions required to bring about freedom, is just one more 
misplaced faith. Recognition of slavery is not the same as actualizing freedom. The role 
and use of reason to bring about freedom is only ever one factor of many. Taking reason 
103 Recent studies of a tribe of baboons (a war-like simian cousin of homo sapien), whose overtly 
aggressive males were decimated, resulted in overturning the balance of power in the favor of the more 
docile female baboons. Since then, even new-comer males have exhibited an abject lack of hostility four 
generations later. A “cultural shift” occurred resulting in a more peaceful tribe of baboons. 
Sapolsky, Robert M. A Natural History of Peace, Foreign Affairs, February 2006.
104 Dewey, John Freedom and Culture p. 26.
105 Conditions not decided by free institutions but instead by fiat.
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as  the  sole  arbiter  of  freedom is  a  course  of  action  that  runs  the  very real  risk  of 
overturning the very goal it aims at. 
Locke’s theory of ownership stated that mixing one’s labor with natural products 
is the basis for granting ownership of the finished product.  This very straight-forward 
principle,  when  applied  to  the  labor  of  contemporary  corporate  practices  appears 
conflicted. On the one hand, people are free to sell their labor, on the market, for whatever 
price  it  will garner.  This  appears  to  be  quite  in line with  Locke’s  theory  of  value. 
However, corporate laborers are incapable of controlling the means by which they labor; 
many are not able to  come into the possession of the machines and financial resources 
necessary to  perform contemporary business practices outside of pure chance or  dumb 
luck. The inability to own land, in Locke’s time, was the main focus of his theory of labor 
precisely because it was the means by which people could labor freely and not at the whim 
of another. Since ownership of the means of labor are not at the disposal of those now 
working,  it  appears that  contemporary practices are  at  odds  with Locke’s concept  of 
ownership.
III. Criticisms of Mill
This section will consist  of  five criticisms of Mill’s philosophy.  I  question the 
“profit and loss” mentality of the theory of utility as being little different than bottom-line 
pecuniary practice. Next I question the consequentialist bent of Mill’s philosophy and how 
this can support atrocious means if the end result is “good.” Then I discuss Mill’s view of 
society as an aggregate of individuals and criticize this view as too  narrowly fixated on 
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individuals. Following that, I criticize Mill’s theory of freedom and harm as too narrowly 
focused on the result rather than the means to  accomplishing it. Finally, I apply Mill’s 
harm principle to some contemporary corporate practices.
Dewey says of Utilitarianism, the doctrine Mill openly and loudly espouses, that it 
is a theory which “consists in calculation of courses of action on the basis of “profit and 
loss” to  which they lead.”106 Even in light of Mill’s modification of Bentham’s hedonic 
calculus to a more qualitative or ethical calculus, still the central criticism remains sound. 
Taking profit and loss as the basis for determining action, however, can often result in 
performing actions for another which that individual would not like performed in the name 
of utility. Wiredu has argued that  while Mill did at  points claim to  have included the 
Golden Rule in his conception of utility, even going so far as to claim that “to do as you 
would be done by … and to love your neighbor as yourself” are the highest formulations 
of the principle of utility, nevertheless the Golden Rule was not explicitly stated in the 
principle of utility.107 If the Golden Rule is how we are supposed to interpret the principle 
of  utility,  why  not  include  its  formulation  as  a  principle  (if  not  the  principle)  of 
Utilitarianism? Evidently even intelligent  commentators  did  not  realize its  “centrality” 
otherwise they would  not  have pushed him to  make the  statements  I  quoted  earlier. 
Without some variation of the Golden Rule, Utilitarianism’s inclination to profit and loss 
thinking easily habituates an individual into operating on bottom-line thinking. It  is no 
surprise that many businessmen today espouse something like a Utilitarian mindset (albeit 
106 Ibid p. 199.
107 Wiredu, Kwasi On the idea of a Global Ethic Journal of Global Ethics vol. 1, no. 1, June 2005, p 49, 
quote from Mill found in Utilitarianism. 
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devoid of a principle such as the Golden Rule). 
Another  criticism of  Mill’s  theories  is  of  their  consequentialist  inclination.  A 
consequentialist theory determines the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule based 
upon its actual consequence. While at first blush this appears entirely sensible, some rather 
disturbing  means  can  be  used  to  accomplish otherwise  praiseworthy ends.  Take,  for 
instance, the preemptive invasion of a country in order to  free said country of a brutal 
dictatorship. While the end, were it accomplished, is an admirable and praiseworthy end, if 
the means of accomplishing this are the bloody and devastating use of military might, 
many individuals shudder to accept this as an acceptable course of events. A thorough-
going Utilitarian would tally up the profits (no more brutal dictatorship) versus the losses 
(civilian  casualties,  the  temporary  disruption  of  economic  progress,  destruction  of 
infrastructure, etc.). If the pain and suffering caused by the continuation of the dictatorship 
are  outweighed  by the  benefits  of  its  overthrow,  regardless  of  the  means needed  to 
accomplish it, so be it. A strong criticism of this is Dewey’s continuum of ends and means. 
On this he states that 
means are means; they are intermediates, middle terms. To grasp this fact is 
to have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends. The “end” is 
merely a series of actions viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely 
the series viewed at an earlier one.108
Since I never encountered a similar reliance upon the continuum of ends and means in 
Mill, I  am only left  assuming it  is lacking.  With this  ends-means continuum lacking, 
unsavory means could be utilized to bring about otherwise “useful” or even “good” ends. 
Another way of stating this is some ends would be pursued by any means necessary. But 
108 Dewey, John Human Nature and Conduct p. 34.
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if Dewey’s continuum of means and ends is correct, brutal means result in nothing other 
than brutal ends. The bloody means are the end viewed at an “earlier time” while the “end” 
would be those means viewed at a later time. Said differently, Dewey would be critical of 
any attempt to bring about peace through violence, any attempt to bring about democracy 
through tyranny and any attempt to bring about freedom through enslavement. Mill, also, 
might also have been unwilling to accept these courses of action, but his writings are silent 
on the matter. 
Mill’s harm principle states  that  human freedom should ring out  and stop  only 
where it impinges upon the ability of others to likewise be free. However, this formulation 
of  freedom ignores  the  concrete  social,  political,  economic,  and other  conditions that 
allow for freedom. Someone may not be capable of entering freely into a course of action, 
whether  it  harms anyone or  not.  Merely placing harm as  the  limitation does  little  to 
produce  freedom. Case in point, the victims of Hurricane Katrina were “free to  leave” 
New Orleans whenever they wanted. No one was preventing them from leaving. However, 
lacking the  material ability (i.e.  lacking ownership of a  vehicle)  prevented them from 
leaving.  In effect,  they were  less free than those  who owned vehicles.  While no  one 
directly caused them harm, still their freedom was checked. Without theory specifically 
directed at meliorating this difficulty, Mill’s theory of freedom appears inadequate.
A final criticism is in light of the application (or rather the lack of application) of 
his harm principle. Taking Mill’s harm principle at face value, harm is the arbiter of where 
freedom is checked. Dumping of toxic chemicals that would otherwise be expensive to 
dispose of, speeding to sale products not fully tested for safety in order to save money on 
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research and development, as well as lobbying efforts meant to motivate nations to war by 
munitions manufacturers  are  all examples of common corporate   practices that  would 
violate Mill’s harm principle.  
While the Utilitarianism mindset of profit and loss may have been widely adopted, 
the greatest good for the greatest number has not been so likewise adopted, nor has Mill’s 
harm principle. Taken in piecemeal, the principle of utility without  the principle of the 
greatest  good  is dangerous.  Consequentialist  thinking combined with the  mentality of 
“profit  and  loss,”  and  non-social  atomistic  individualism,  make  for  a  dangerous 
concoction. 
IV. Criticisms of Dewey
I discuss three problems with Dewey’s theories. I question Dewey’s optimism in 
democracy, examine his description of returning to  immediate experience, especially as 
related to people who readily and quickly drop into their cognitive mode, and I examine 
Dewey’s support of armed conflict in WWI in light of his ends and means continuum. 
Dewey had great faith in the ability for Democracy to arrive at the most intelligent 
solution  to  a  given problem. Through  collaboration  and deliberation a  community of 
inquirers was better equipped than any single inquirer to arrive at the best available course 
of action. However, Dewey had failed to take into account the influence of widespread 
propaganda usage and how insidious this form of mass suggestion could be on individuals 
until after the end of World War I. Rather than promoting discussion and engaging the 
public  on  a  given  issue,  mass  suggestion  limits  issues  to  short  “sound  bites”  easily 
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digestible and requiring little in the way of critical engagement. Mass media in the form of 
radio and television had subdued public debate more thoroughly than ever before. Instead 
of acting democratically and creatively, people separate into bitterly divided camps along 
loose  and  shaky grounds.  To  be  fair,  Dewey had  envisioned  a  restructuring  of  the 
institution  of  public  education  to  combat  this  effect,  but  lacking  implementation, 
democratic activity became little more than mass suggestibility and empty verbiage on the 
part of public officials to avoid commitment to a position that could be criticized. 
Dewey’s concept of immediate experience can be characterized, with little in the 
way of violence to the theory, as returning to homeostasis. When problems or situations 
far outside of normal expectation of events occur, Dewey stated that we drop out of the 
immediacy of experience and enter into a diagnostic mode of sort.  Typically, this mode 
was the cognitive mode (if people’s habits are properly oriented), but it could easily be the 
aesthetic, political, ethical or any number of other modes. The point of entering this new 
mode was to  interpret the experience, incorporate it, direct it and  return to immediacy. 
However, there exists a pugnacious group of individuals that appear to violate this rule 
continuously and Dewey himself belonged to such a group: philosophers. 
By most  accounts,  philosophers spend as much, if not  more time, utilizing the 
cognitive  mode  of  experience  than  they do  in  its  immediate  form.109 Too  often  the 
immediate mode is the less familiar to those who feel more comfortable dropping into the 
cognitive mode of experience. Aristotle went so far as to describe cognition as the greatest 
109 Thales was so often inclined to have his head in the clouds that it is rumored he once fell into a well! If 
the cognitive mode is supposed to return us to immediacy, why is it then that philosophers often appear to 
others to have their “eyes ruined” from the journey outside of the cave of ignorance? See also Plato, The  
Republic VII, 516e.
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end for which humans are suited, rather than just a mode utilized for problem solving.110
Dewey  supported  America’s  entrance  into  WWI  because  he  believed  doing 
otherwise would  be  disastrous  for  America and perhaps  even for  all of  Europe.  His 
outspoken support  of armed conflict appears deeply at odds with 1) his own preference 
for  non-violence and 2)  his means-ends continuum. The first  criticism perhaps can be 
circumvented by stating something along the lines of “in times of dire need, preferences 
should be overlooked, even on matters of major importance.”  While this statement may 
be true, it does nothing to protect against the second criticism: if war is the means, how 
could Dewey have conceived of an end that was positive? It  appears to  be an outright 
contradiction to  hold the continuum of means and ends (to  see means as “steps on the 
path” toward  an end) where bloodshed and violence is the means and the democratic 
community is the end.
V. Closing Remarks
For  traditional  Liberal  thinkers,  a  “grab-bag”  of  theoretical  positions  has 
historically gone  “hand-in-hand.”  To  begin,  there  is  Locke’s  empiricism whereby all 
knowledge is reducible to sense-experience. Anything else is merely the gluing together of 
sense experience known as reason. Once committed to a view of sense-datum and mere 
relations of ideas, materialism comes easily afterwards. All of this is in accord with certain 
modern  thinkers,  who  hold  there  are  either  mental  substances,  or  there  are  physical 
substances; a dualism adopted  from Descartes.  This dualism was pushed further when 
110 Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics, book X, chapter 7. 
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Descartes’ incompatibility of interaction of substances forced Modern thinkers to choose 
either a plurality of non-interacting pre-established substances (Leibniz’ monadology) or a 
single substance (Spinoza’s idealism). Sense-datum falls squarely under the category of 
physical “stuffs” and so Locke believed an empirical epistemology committed one to  a 
material ontology and denied any purely “mental” substance. 
Materialism,  in  turn,  goes  side-by-side  with  a  mechanistic  conception  of  the 
universe adopted from Newtonian or Cartesian physics. Causal determinism follows from 
mechanistic  materialism  and  so  many  empiricists  are  likewise  committed  to  causal 
determinism. Where in this model exists freedom, some ask. It appears to systematize the 
universe and make no room for freedom save for “the absence of external impediments” 
that Hobbes posited in Leviathan. Humans, in this vision, are mere phenomenon operating 
entirely causally and determined from the point of creation; a re-hashing of Leibniz’ pre-
established harmony has effectively occurred, even though his ontological monadology is 
rejected in favor of materialism. It is no surprise that these thinkers also believe human 
rights can be little more than the removing of “artificial” blockages to the inherently “free” 
human nature. After all, “freedom” in this view is something inherent and inborn; it needs 
only the removal of the chains of society before it can be actualized. 
However, if this freedom is omnipresent in human nature, no institution would be 
capable of stamping it out.  It  would be “ontologically prior” to any intervention on the 
part of culture or experience. A conception of  laissez faire would of course follow, by 
removing  “artificial”  blockages,  human  freedom  could  ring  out.  Historically  this  is 
precisely what occurred. The conceptual tension of blocking immutable aspects of human 
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nature with “artificial” institutions was glossed in order to  institute pecuniary practices 
that favored the rising dominance of the middle-class and merchants. .
Just as John Donne stated that “no man is an Island unto himself,” a theory of 
individualism, especially as espoused by thinkers such as John Dewey, erodes the dualism 
of self and society. I do not believe this commits one to some version of communism, but 
rather  a  variant  of  socialism or  perhaps  communalism,  where  private  ownership  and 
common  ownership  converge  at  a  happy  medium.  Neither  the  “individual”  nor  the 
collective as a whole are taken as logically prior; rather, the individual is a part of society 
and society exists as more than merely a collection of individuals. Societal factors loom 
large in any given human’s life, but there would be no societies save for the existence of 
humans. Neither could exist without the other. 
At  this  point,  some may ask  why an  individual could  not  live without  social 
existence; Aristotle called such entities that  lived outside of social life either “Gods or 
beasts” but not people. Further, a newborn child could not exist for more than a single day 
(perhaps  less)  without  the  altruistic  intervention  of  another,  typically  its  paternal 
guardians. Therefore human community is required for anyone to reach adulthood. Feral 
children,  children  raised  by  other  animals,  never  develop  beyond  simple  animalistic 
instincts and therefore do not  cultivate their innate reason, human intelligence or  their 
ability to communicate with others outside of simple yelps, grunts and moans. Even feral 
children must  be a minimum age before being abandoned else they do  not  live at  all. 
Likewise, were a fully developed and cultivated person to  retreat  forever into solitude, 
they would bring with them the acquired social intelligence of their culture, history and 
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education as learned from others. 
Philosophy serves as one social factor  that  plays a role in the development  of 
individuals.  Just  as  more  “concrete”  factors  of  economics,  politics,  military conquest, 
religious  activity, education  and mass media play pivotal  roles  in contributing to  the 
absence of human freedom, so also does philosophy play a role of systematizing these 
influences and abstracting them from specific situations into general concepts and allowing 
for  the  identification  of  proper  weight.  But  systemization  occurs  only if  philosophy 
discusses “cultural conditions, conditions of science, art, morality, religion, education and 
industry so  as  to  discover  which of  them in actuality promote  and which retard  the 
development  of the native constituents  of human nature.”111 If the bulk of the  critical 
philosophy being produced by “the schools”112 continues to be myopically concerned with 
necessary conditions  of  language  rather  than  the  applications  of  languages  to  social 
conditions, philosophy has ushered in another age of counting how many angels fit on the 
head of a pin.
The “Linguistic Turn” of 20th century philosophy ushered in an age of formalism 
that Dewey had long feared would occur. By formalizing philosophy, larger and messier 
issues  such  as  social  justice  become  mere  “linguistic  anomalies.”113 Why must  many 
philosophers  in America be largely silent  rather  than constantly and loudly engage  in 
discussing those activities which promote and retard the constituents of human nature? 
Power-brokers  in Washington do  not  accept  such limitations nor  do  the  International 
111 Dewey, John Freedom and Culture p. 33.
112 A term of derision in Locke’s time that just may be appropriate today
113 Philosophers such as Richard Shusterman suggest that in the “post-modern” era philosophers should be 
confined to campus activism (reference)
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Monetary Fund and World Bank harbor any such limitation of scope. 
It  is not  that  public philosophy is impotent  or  lacking a  voice; we are merely 
purposely self-muted.  When philosophers  such as  Peter  Singer  communicate  with the 
wider public, there are mixed reactions. Some hate him for his message, many do not 
understand him, but those who do understand him often find it compelling and interesting. 
Those  not  steeped  in the  canon of  philosophy are  not  swayed by deconstructionalist 
arguments, post-modern puzzles or analytic formalism. They are engaged by discussions 
about the rich and the poor, access to healthcare, environmental degradation and political 
reform. Formalizing these issues will do little to resolve them. 
It  is just  these issues that  philosophers need to  focus on in order  to  empower 
philosophy, engage the public, become more involved with melioration of societal ills and 
work to reduce suffering. It is also these issues that philosophers are largely silent about. 
There are rare individuals that  venture onto  the public stage,  but they are few and far 
between.  Paradoxically,  with  the  largest  enrollment  of  the  American  Philosophical 
Association than ever before, there are likewise fewer public Intellectuals than ever before.
Therefore to enter again the public stage, philosophers must examine the concrete 
practical effects of the current and existent social conditions and take these as a starting 
point. Then, we must imagine a point in the future that is desired to be attained. Then we 
must  project  the  most  immediate  means  to  accomplish this  end.  Finally,  we  should 
examine the power structures that exist which promote widespread injustice and attempt 
to mediate their influence. 
Locke has shown that it is possible to contribute to the bloodless disruption of a 
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hegemonic power by loudly criticizing the assumptions which its system is based upon. 
Mill’s time in parliament saw an expansion of suffrage, the first work on women’s suffrage 
and child labor laws. During Dewey’s life, he was pivotal in founding organizations such 
as the NAACP, the Teacher’s Union and he also sat on the trial of Trotsky, in Mexico. 
Many existing social ills can be meliorated, but only through the use of intelligence, careful 
planning and the intervention of people willing to question the indoctrination of the status 
quo. This is the spirit of Socrates as he ceaselessly questioned those in power showing 
that  they, by and large,  did not  deserve the responsibilities they held. It  is the role of 
philosophy to be the watchdog of freedom.
Dewey took culture to be the most active aspect of human nature and he took the 
role of philosophy to be a critic of culture. Combine this with the fact that culture, and not 
power,  or  love of money, or  love of freedom or  some other  supposed “psychological 
factor” is at the root of human action, then criticism of culture is a far more influential role 
than most philosophers are willing to admit. But philosophers are only critics of culture 
when they engage cultural issues. Therefore,  unless philosophers once more engage in 
criticism of  culture,  especially pecuniary culture,  then love of  money and power  will 
continue  to  be  dominant  explanations  for  human  motivation.  Much  like  when  an 
inappropriate diagnosis of a medical condition is made, steps to meliorate current social 
ills will continue to  be  ineffective at  best  and  counter-effective at  worst  without  the 
correct ailment in mind.
In conclusion, in order to isolate which conditions “promote and which retard the 
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development of the native constituents of human nature,”114 it is important  to  focus on 
educational reform. With educational experimentation focused on promoting the native 
constituents of human nature to  assist individuals in becoming self-directing, flourishing 
members of communities, it is possible for those that come after us to receive their culture 
“more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have 
received it”115 such that they may more easily adapt to the conditions they face.  The reader 
will here  have  to  excuse  me since the  educational consequences  of  individualism go 
beyond the scope of this work and therefore must be the subject of a monograph of their 
own.
114 Dewey, John Freedom and Culture p. 33.
115 Dewey, John A Common Faith p. 87.
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